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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes the evolution of the defense budget process in Ukraine, from 
independence to 2006.  It identifies and evaluates factors that directly affected the 
development of the defense budget process and determined the distribution of power in 
that process and examines the efficiency of defense budgets as policy tools. This study 
contributes towards an understanding of the relative power of the executive versus the 
legislative branch in shaping defense policy. It concludes that important but limited 
progress has occurred in the defense budget realm in Ukraine since independence. The 
absence of a clear political guidance, deficiencies of defense legislation, and insufficient 
levels of co-operation between the executive and the legislative branch of the government 
are key problems involved in defense budgeting and reform in Ukraine. Certain 
improvements and overall intensification of efforts occurred as a result of the NATO-
Ukraine Action Plan in 2002. Actions undertaken by the Ukrainian government during 
the period from 2002 to the beginning of 2006, including the introduction of the law On 
Organization of the Defense Planning in 2004, had a minimal impact because of 
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Defense funding is an important indicator of the attitude of a state towards its 
armed forces, and the processes of appropriation and allocation of funds for national 
security are vital, especially when resources are scarce.   
 
The Armed Forces of the independent Ukraine emerged from the portion of the 
Soviet Army left in its territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union: 780,000 military 
personnel and tons of armament and military equipment, including nuclear weapons.1 
These assets not only provided a sufficient base to build the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 
but also forced the new government to deal with the wide array of difficult issues 
associated with supporting and reforming those forces.   
 
One of the primary issues was the development of the defense budget process.  
This aspect of the state budget did not exist in the budget of the Soviet Ukraine, as 
defense itself was a prerogative of the federal government of the Soviet Union.  The laws 
“On Defense of Ukraine” and “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine” passed by the 
Verkhovna Rada (the parliament of Ukraine) in December 1991 were among its first 
legislative acts and were intended to provide support for the formation of armed forces in 
line with a commitment to democracy in the country.  These laws established a legal 
foundation for the development of the armed forces, including authorities of the state 
institutions regarding defense budgeting.   
 
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have gone through a significant transformation.  So 
has the budget of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (MOD), which was represented by 
                                                 
1 Ministry Of Defense Of Ukraine. The history of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Online. Internet. 
Available  http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=history&sub=history  (15 February 2006). 
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one line in The Law on the State Budget of Ukraine in 19922.  Since that time, it has 
evolved in more detailed forms.  However, the reality of defense budgets of the 
independent Ukraine is that they were barely able to support the survival of one of the 
biggest armies in Europe.  Funds appropriated for defense were not sufficient to 
accomplish any of the projects initiated by the MOD aimed towards the modernization 
and reformation of the Armed Forces, including the downsizing of the military.  In the 
period of 2003-2004, the military reform challenge raised the issue of the appropriate size 
of the military and how to finance its reform.  Additionally, aspirations to join NATO, 
declared by President Kuchma in 2002, raised the issue of conformity of Ukrainian 
military structures and processes with NATO standards.  
 
Efforts to solve the Gordian knot of Ukrainian defense reform resulted in a 
number of measures, including the “Law on Organization of the Defense Planning”, 
passed by the parliament in June, 2004.  It was intended to regulate decision making in 
the defense realm involving different participants in the process and, in effect, to be the 
first step towards creation of a cohesive defense planning and budgeting system.  
Adoption of this law was intended to fulfill a number of commitments made by Ukraine 
in 2002 when it signed the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.  This initiative was designed to 
“increase transparency in defense planning and budgeting procedures; transition to 
modern NATO defense programming, budgeting and financing principles”, “reform 
financial planning and funding procedures in support of defense reform and the 
transformation of the Armed Forces into a professional force,”3 as well as other 
objectives related to the development of an efficient defense resource management 
system in Ukraine.  
 
                                                 
2 The first budget legislation of independent Ukraine. 
3  NATO. NATO – Ukraine Action Plan. Online. Internet. Available 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm  (15 February 2006). 
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  Most recently, in his radio address to the nation on December 10, 2005, 
President Yushchenko stated,  
I am confident that 2006 will be a year of a breakthrough in the 
development of the Armed Forces. The defense budget is increasing by 
51%. . . . I appreciate the Parliament for legislative support to 
strengthening the Ukrainian military. It is important that all the factions of 
the Verkhovna Rada care about the development of the Armed Forces.4  
 
This thesis will analyze the history of the defense budget process in the 
independent Ukraine, identify the factors which influenced the process during its 
development, and examine the distribution of power among various participants within 
the process with a focus on the role of parliament.  Also it will examine the efficiency of 
the defense budget as a policy tool of the government of Ukraine in the defense realm in 
the past as well as at the current stage of the defense reform.   
B. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to describe the evolution of the defense budget 
process in Ukraine and assess the role of parliament in the process during its 
development.  It is intended:  
• To identify and evaluate those factors that directly affected the 
development of the defense budget process in Ukraine and determined the 
distribution of power in the process as it has unfolded since independence;  
• To discuss the current state of the defense budget process in Ukraine and 
recent issues related to its development. 
 C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question to be addressed in this thesis is: How has the role 
of the Verkhovna Rada in budgeting for defense in Ukraine changed from independence 
to 2006?  
 
                                                 
4 Ministry Of  Defense Of Ukraine. Speeches and Interviews of the Senior Leadership. President 
Yushchenko, Radio address. Available 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=ua&part=appearance&sub=read&id=6315  (16 February 2006). 
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Subsidiary research questions include the following: 
• What significant changes occurred in the defense structures of Ukraine 
since 1991? 
• What were the main determinants of the defense budget process in 
Ukraine during the period from 1991 to 2006? 
• To what degree was the defense policy of Ukraine supported by spending 
during the period 1991 - 2006?  
• How does co-operation between Ukraine and NATO influence 
developments in the Ukrainian defense budget process? 
• What is the current structure of the defense budget process in Ukraine? 
• What are the possible problems and outcomes of implementation of the 
“Law on Organization of the Defense Planning”? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will identify the key changes in legislative authority including actions 
and events regarding the defense budget process in Ukraine in a historical perspective.   
Data will be obtained from literature reviews of books, journal and newspaper articles, 
websites, academic databases, and other information resources.    
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized as follows.  The first chapter explains the rational for and 
logic of this thesis.  The first section of this chapter provides a brief background on the 
development of the Armed Forces and the defense budget process in Ukraine since 
independence.  It is followed by the objectives of this thesis, the list of the research 
questions to be addressed and a description of the methodology to be employed to 
produce answers.  
 
The second chapter describes the history of the development of the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine and the political environment in which this process has occurred.  It also 
identifies major changes in the Ukrainian defense structures and provides a picture of 
defense spending during the period since independence to 2005.  
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The third chapter describes the evolution of the defense budget process in Ukraine 
and arrangements within the government related to this.  The chapter is subdivided into 
three main sections.  The first part examines defense budgeting during the period between 
independence in 1991 and the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996.  The 
second part discusses the process from 1996 to 2004.  The roles of the executive and 
legislative branches will be considered.  The third part focuses on the mechanisms 
available to the legislature to control defense spending. 
 
The fourth chapter covers developments in the defense realm during the period 
2004 -2006 and examines how they have affected defense budgeting in Ukraine.  Special 
attention will be given to the impact of co-operation with NATO in the sphere of defense 
resource management.  Specifically discussed will be the Strategic Defense Bulletin (the 
“White Book” of Ukraine) and the new Law on Organization of the Defense Planning.  
These are the first steps towards practical implementation of NATO planning and 
budgeting standards in Ukraine.  Next, it will describe future plans for defense 
reformation in Ukraine and discuss their budgetary implications.  An overview of the 
2005 and 2006 defense budgets will be included.  
 
The fifth chapter will conclude the thesis with an overall picture of the evolution 
of the defense budget process in Ukraine followed by the author’s observations and 




















II. LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES BETWEEN 1991 AND 
2006 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief historical overview of the political environment in 
which the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) were established and developed.  Such an 
overview is helpful to understand the primary driving forces and figures behind the 
decisions made by Ukrainian leaders on the defense issues including those regarding the 
defense budget. The chapter starts with select comments on 20th century Ukrainian 
history, followed by a description of major political developments from 1991 to 2006 
followed by a summary of structural reforms in the AFU and an overview of defense 
spending in Ukraine during this period.  
B. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
1. History Lessons 
With collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 the Ukrainian people for the first 
time in their centuries-old history had a chance to have their own state.  As the news 
about the collapse of the tsarists’ regime reached the Ukrainian capital – Kyiv – three 
major organizations emerged from the chaos which followed the February revolution in 
Petrograd. Former city officials formed an executive committee to maintain order and to 
act as an extension of Petrograd’s Provisional Government.  The radical left was 
represented by the Kyiv Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies which acted on behalf 
of the Bolsheviks’ party. However, the strongest support among the Ukrainian population 
was generated by the Central Rada (“council” in Ukrainian). Prominent representatives 
from the Ukrainian liberal intelligentsia, who initially formed the Central Rada, were 
immediately joined by Ukrainian Social Democrats and Socialists.  
 
The initiative gained popularity and legitimacy. A Ukrainian National Congress, 
convened in Kyiv on 19 April 1917 and comprised of 900 delegates from all over 
Ukraine and Ukrainian communities throughout the former empire representing the 
various segments of Ukrainian society, elected 150 representatives to the Central Rada. A 
 8
Congress of Ukrainians serving in the army which was held on 18 April in Kyiv also 
affirmed the Central Rada’s leadership. It was supported as well by the congresses of the 
Ukrainian peasants and workers. Even though smaller groups of the Ukrainian society 
like Jews and Russians were disturbed by the rise of the Central Rada, they later joined it, 
attracted by the promise of far-ranging cultural autonomy. 
  
On 23 June 1917 the Central Rada issued its First Universal (manifesto) which 
claimed the right of the Ukrainian people to govern their land. It proclaimed the 
establishment of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) without a complete separation 
from Russia. By this act, the Central Rada intended to gain recognition as the highest 
political authority in Ukraine. It also formed the General Secretariat, the executive branch 
of the government which took over responsibility for the administration of Ukraine.  
 
Success of the Central Rada seemed to be complete when the Russian Provisional 
Government, which did not have sufficient resources to enforce its authority in former 
imperial territories, was forced to recognize the administrative authority of the General 
Secretariat. However, newly-fledged Ukrainian politicians soon found themselves caught 
up in revolutionary rhetoric and ideological arguments, disregarding the major practical 
needs of the republic, including the need for a strong and centralized administration.  
 
Their attitude towards the military was noteworthy. These liberal romantics 
argued that the revolution eliminated the need for standing armies and favored the 
creation of “people’s militias”. That is why, in the summer 1917, when about 300,000 
Ukrainian soldiers spontaneously reorganized themselves into all-Ukrainian units that 
swore allegiance to the Central Rada, this force was rejected. In a similar fashion the 
Central Rada did not accept an offer by General Pavlo Skoropadsky who placed at its 
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disposal an Ukrainized corps of 40,000 disciplined and equipped men. However, it soon 
became apparent that without an army a government was impossible.5  
 
Following the October Revolution in Petrograd the Bolsheviks’ offense forced the 
republic’s leadership out of Kyiv by February 1918.  The UNR was temporarily restored 
by the Germans in March within the boundaries agreed to by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
but then replaced by a “Hetmanate” in April.6 The “Hetmanate” was a conservative 
Ukrainian government headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky (the title of Hetman was 
recalled from the Cossack era and associated with early stages of Ukrainian statehood). 
  
During less than eight months of his rule, Skoropadsky, a former tsar general, 
achieved significant progress in restoring order in the country, building an administrative 
apparatus and “ukrainianising” education. Despite the Germans who discouraged the 
development of a large Ukrainian military force that might challenge their overwhelming 
influence, Skoropadsky created an army of 65,000.7 
 
However, the situation in Europe and the political interests of the great powers did 
not favor an independent Ukraine at this time. Compromised by the German protectorate, 
Skoropadsky was overthrown by the rebellion of radical Ukrainian nationalists who 
reestablished the UNR in December 1918. However, the military performance of the 
Ukrainian government’s troops was as disappointing as it had been a year earlier.8 A 
sequence of different revolutionary and occupational governments ruled Kyiv until 1921, 
when the Bolsheviks ultimately took control over Ukraine.  
 
                                                 
5 Orest Subtelny . Ukraine: A History. Second Edition. University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. 345-
350.  
6 Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University Press, 2002, p.123. 
7 Ibid., p.127. 
8 Orest Subtelny. Ukraine: A History. Second Edition. University of Toronto Press, 1994, p.362. 
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The Ukrainian nation lost a historical chance to create an independent Ukrainian 
state early in 20th century. It did so for a number of reasons including its neglect of a 
capable military structure. As Ukraine’s former foreign minister Anatoliy Zlenko noted 
shortly after independence in 1992, 
The decision to set up Ukrainian Armed Forces springs not from any 
aggressive intent but from our tragic history… At the beginning of this 
century, Ukraine lost her independence because she had declined to 
maintain her own army. Bitter experience has taught us not to repeat that 
mistake.9 
2. The Ukrainian Parliament and Transition to Independence 
By the end of the 20th century (1991), the Ukrainian parliament had played a 
central role in the political process which eventually resulted in “one of the three major 
geopolitical events of the twentieth century” – the appearance of an independent 
Ukraine.10 The role of the Verkhovna Rada (the parliament of Ukraine) was determined 
by unintended results of “Perestroika” and “Glasnost”. 
 
Not only were President Gorbachev’s reforms for the Soviet economy and 
administrative system not given sufficient thought, they also met resistance from the 
party apparatus and government officials whose interests they threatened. At a time when 
scarce food and consumer goods caused increasing frustration among the population, 
freedom of expression became a means for the nationalities of the USSR to voice their 
grievances and aspirations.11  For those who had alternative beliefs and ideologies, the 
parliament and local councils were the only accessible avenues to the realization of their 
ideas, since other governmental structures were either occupied or controlled by the 
                                                 
9 Anatoliy Zlenko. Independent Ukraine: Risk of Stability? RUSI Journal, April 1992, p.39 (quoted in: 
Taras Kuzio. Ukrainian Security Policy. Westport, 1995, p.11). 
10 This is the view of  Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter. The 
other two, according to Brzezinski, were the collapse of the European empires in 1917-18 and the 
appearance of the Iron Curtain). Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University 
Press, 2002, p. 316. 
11 Orest Subtelny. Ukraine: A History. Second Edition. University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 574.  
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conservative communist elite. In Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada was the governmental 
institution through which Ukrainian democrats could participate in the political process. 
 
The first relatively free parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held in March 
1990. They brought 90 of a total of 450 seats in the Ukrainian parliament to the 
Democratic Block which was composed of several non-Communist forces. Even though 
the communists, who won 239 seats, remained a majority for the first time they had to 
face a legal opposition in the parliamentary seating.12 Meanwhile, the deteriorating 
economy and paralysis of the existing political system were pushing crucial decisions to 
the forefront.  
 
Many in Ukraine, including the Rada’s deputies, saw the causes of the economic 
collapse as the inability of Moscow officials to rule the country and believed that 
increased decentralization would be a key solution to the problem. In July 1990, the 
Verkhovna Rada passed the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine. The 
document did not declare Ukraine as an independent state but it was the first move 
towards self-determination. The Declaration proclaimed the right of the Ukrainian people 
to control their land and natural resources, guaranteed freedom of cultural development to 
all nationalities, made provision for distinct Ukrainian citizenship, and provided for 
separate armed forces and a security service for Ukraine.13 
 
This development generally matched with Gorbachev’s fundamental plans for 
restructuring the Soviet Union which were designed to provide the republics with greater 
power. These plans, however, were averted by a group of the top Soviet leaders who 
launched a preventive coup in Moscow on 19 August 1991. Their efforts, which were 
undertaken to preserve the country, triggered irreversible political changes. Reformist 
                                                 
12 Orest Subtelny. Ukraine: A History. Second Edition. University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 577.  
13 Bohdan Harasymiw. Post-Communist Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002, 
p. 5. 
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forces quickly realized that the initiators of the coup had neither a clear action plan nor 
decisiveness to go far enough to apply violent measures to their opponents and took 
advantage of the situation to prove the inability of the communists to rule the state. Boris 
Yeltsin, president of the Russian Republic, promptly mobilized his supporters and ruined 
the plans of the plotters. With de facto acquired power in Moscow, Yeltsin began to seek 
a formal means of eliminating the remaining authority of the Soviet President Gorbachev. 
  
The reaction of the Ukrainian leaders to the events in Moscow was to wait-and-
see. By 21 August it became clear that the coup had failed. The Communist party was 
compromised and began to lose its members including some Ukrainian parliamentarians. 
Illegitimate actions of the top Moscow leadership created an opportunity for those who 
were dissatisfied with central rule to reject it. On 24 August the Verkhovna Rada 
proclaimed the independence of Ukraine by an almost unanimous vote. With only one 
vote against, even hard line communists voted in favor of independence; however, a 
provision was added to require a referendum to be held in December among Ukrainian 
citizens to confirm the decision. Several days later the Communist majority announced its 
self-dissolution, thereby shifting the balance of power to the democratic forces. On 29 
August the parliament passed a resolution which banned the Communist party altogether 
on the basis of evidence that its leadership supported the coup attempt in Moscow. 
 
  The referendum was scheduled on 1 December 1991, on the same day as 
presidential elections. The results were beyond the most optimistic expectations of the 
democrats: 84.2 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote and over 90 per cent of 
voters supported independence.14 Especially important was the fact that this 
overwhelming percentage included not only Ukrainians but also Russians and other 
nationalities, which in 1991 composed 27 percent of the population.15 Leonid Kravchuk, 
                                                 
14 Bohdan Harasymiw. Post-Communist Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002, 
p. 8. 
15 Encyclopedia Britannica. Ukraine. Internet. Online. Available http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
30102  (9 March 2006).  
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the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, the most popular and capable political institution of 
that time, became the president of Ukraine. 
 
Disintegration of the USSR began when three Baltic republics withdrew 
themselves from the Union. The Ukrainian referendum added momentum to the process. 
When the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus secretly met at the party’s elite hunting 
resort near the Belarusian city of Brest on 7 December, Russia already had proclaimed 
independence and President Kravchuk attended the summit just after the Ukrainian 
referendum. Claiming the right to dismantle the Soviet Union as their three republics 
were its original founders,16 Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and the Belarusian leader Shushkevich 
signed a treaty which formally dissolved the USSR and put in place the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) as a transitional structure opened for other former Soviet 
republics to join. Although the summit’s authority was controversial and many 
subsequent issues had been left unresolved, the Ukrainian proclamation of independence 
became a political reality. 
 
Nonetheless, all the power structures – the Ministry of Defense, Soviet Security 
Service (KGB), and the Ministry of Interior – remained under formal control of the 
Union center. Not until 25 December when Gorbachev resigned from the post of the 
President of the Soviet Union17 was it clear that a threat of using violent methods against 
Ukraine by the Union center had passed.18 
3. The First Steps towards the National Defense Structure  
In essence, some members of the parliament had begun the actual work towards 
creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces even before 19 August. Members of the Rukh, a 
nationalistic wing of the Democratic Block, had contact with military officers who shared 
                                                 
16 Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University Press, 2002, p.170. 
17 Gorbachev Resigns As the Soviet Union Breaks Up. On This Day. BBC News. Internet. Online. 
Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/25/newsid_2542000/2542749.stm     
(9 March 2006).  
18 Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University Press, 2002, p.171. 
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democratic and nationalistic ideas and used them as a medium to inquire about attitudes 
within the officer corps. They even managed to organize a number of active duty and 
retired officers, mostly from the Western Ukraine, into the Union of Officers of Ukraine 
(UOU), an organization which was thought to provide expertise and to be a nucleus for 
formation of the Ukrainian military.19 However, it was important to enlist support from 
Soviet military leadership – the commanders of military districts and armies stationed in 
Ukraine.  
 
Because of the Ukraine’s strategic location, a disproportionately large number of 
the Soviet military personnel were stationed in its territory. The military also had access 
to and control over enormous stockpiles of armaments, including nuclear weapons. This 
potentially dangerous force was a great concern for the democrats. On 27 August 1991, 
the speaker of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, arranged a meeting with senior military 
commanders to exchange opinions about the future of the Ukrainian military. Most of the 
generals were rather pessimistic about the very possibility of creating and maintaining 
armed forces subordinated to the Ukrainian government. They argued that it would be too 
costly and overall impossible to tear such a big chunk out of the integrated Soviet 
military structure. The only one who came up with a plausible idea about what a new 
Ukrainian army would look like and how it would be structured was the commander of 
the 17th Air Army, General Kostiantyn Morozov. His idea was to maintain the general 
Soviet military structure but subordinate it to the Ukrainian political leadership, with 
some components contributing to the joint Union defense system and then gradually 
reduce and reform it to an appropriate size which would fit within the state’s capacity to 
support it and be sufficient to ensure security of Ukraine.20 
 
                                                 
19 Konstiantyn Morozov. Above and Beyond: From Soviet General to Ukrainian State Builder. 
Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 133-136, 225.  
20 Ibid., pp.133, 143-146, 152. 
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The Verkhovna Rada undertook the first steps towards creation of state 
institutions in July 1991 when two laws created a national bank and the presidency.21 As 
momentum in favor of independence had been growing in the fall of 1991, the parliament 
accelerated its efforts to put in place as many state attributes as possible. On 3 September, 
General Morozov was appointed by the parliament to be the first Ukrainian Minister of 
Defense. On 11 October, the Rada adopted a resolution called the Conception of Defense 
and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in which it denoted the government’s 
agenda for the creation of the Ukrainian military. 
 
The document stated the intent of the Rada to create strong, capable, but 
appropriately sized Armed forces on the basis of military units located in the Ukrainian 
territory and a legal base for their functioning; it also stressed the Rada’s commitment to 
achieve a neutral, non-nuclear status for Ukraine, but not at the expense of its security 
considerations. Among other provisions, the conception contained prerequisites for 
development of a defense budget system and allocation of authorities within the defense 
process. The right to approve and control defense budgets was reserved for the 
parliament. The Conception emphasized a need for a constant modernization of military 
doctrine, equipment, and a priority of funding for this process. 
 
During the fall of 1991, General Morozov and his staff, located in six rooms in 
one of the parliamentary buildings, put together an informal network for monitoring 
developments in the military districts of Ukraine still subordinated to Moscow. Their 
work was primarily focused on finding personnel positively motivated, capable, and 
experienced in military planning and restructuring at the level at which they were about 
to operate.22 
 
                                                 
21  Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University Press, 2002, p.167. 
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Harvard University Press, 2000, pp.168-172.  
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The adoption of the laws on the Armed Forces of Ukraine and on the Defense of 
Ukraine set the legal precedent for the development of the Armed Forces. Both laws were 
passed on the same day, 6 December 1991, a day before the historical summit in Belarus. 
 
The referendum of 1 December legalized the Ukrainian minister of defense. The 
CIS treaty and resignation of Gorbachev removed the last obstacles for him to act. In 
January 1992, General Morozov and his team took over the headquarters of the Kyiv 
Military District, administered the oath to officers, shut down the communications system 
linking the district to Moscow, and fired the commanders of the three military districts.23 
 
The time since the parliamentary elections in 1990 and up to the end of 1991 with 
all its dramatic developments was one of a few periods when the Verkhovna Rada was 
able to make timely, consolidated and independent decisions. Moreover, guided by the 
Democratic Bloc, the Rada was the only institution which had a clear understanding of a 
direction in which it was moving in the highly ambiguous environment of rapid Soviet 
decline. The Rada’s end goal was an independent Ukraine. 
4.  An Overview of Ukrainian Politics from 1992 to 2005 
The fact that Leonid Kravchuk, the Rada’s speaker, was elected the first 
Ukrainian president, and that independence became a tangible reality at the end of 1991, 
reduced the momentum towards solving the most relevant problems of the society and 
economy, shifting parliament’s focus towards power-seeking politics. Newly-elected 
president Kravchuk advocated for a strong executive branch which, according to his 
opinion, was needed by the Ukrainian state in its time of transition. Initially, he saw a 
powerful presidency as a means to overrule potentially dangerous communist hardliners 
in the Parliament. The December election results, when people voted for independence 
and gave more than 62 percent of their votes to Kravchuk as a president, provided 
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legitimacy for his position.24 The parliament, however, did not support the idea of a 
strong presidency which led to a conflict among the two institutions of government. The 
main achievements of the early period of Kravchuk’s presidency were foreign 
recognition and international positioning of Ukraine as a developing democracy whose 
stability was one of the major factors in the European security.  
 
Kravchuk’s internal policies were not as successful. Although the institution of 
the presidency contributed to the building of the Ukrainian integrity and prevented 
separatism, it failed to introduce more fundamental reform for the economy and the state 
apparatus. As a result, much of the Soviet Ukrainian economy simply collapsed when it 
was exposed to outside competition and/or required to find markets on its own. Economic 
mismanagement led to catastrophic consequences, the black market flourished and 
inflation soared to an unthinkable 5,371 percents in 1993. 25  
 
Meanwhile, the parliament continued to regard the presidency as a threat to its 
power and was undertaking considerable efforts to weaken it by using the parliamentary 
veto over presidential decrees. The Verkhovna Rada rejected proposals to consolidate 
presidential rule by allowing the executive to head the government and determine its 
members.26  Kravchuk’s failure to organize political support for the presidency, lack of 
reforms and extremely bad economic record led to the victory of the Communist Block in 
the parliamentary elections in March 1994 and ultimately to the loss of the presidency in 
the summer of 1994.  
 
The unsatisfactory state of the defense sector during his presidency was a part of 
the general reform failure. A presidential decree established the National Security 
                                                 
24 Bohdan Harasymiw. Post-Communist Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002, 
pp. 100-101. 
25 Andrew Wilson. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 253-254. 
26 Taras Kuzio. Ukrainian Security Policy. Westport, 1995, p.27. 
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Council on 1 July 1992 as an advisory body attached to the president. It was designed to 
advise and consult on all aspects of policy dealing with national security in the broadest 
sense and included six permanent members (the president, the state advisor on national 
security, the prime minister, the chairman of the Security Service, and the defense and 
foreign ministers). Other cabinet members and state officials significant for national 
security could be called to its meetings without a voting right.27 The President and his 
administration, however, were not able to find consensus over national interests, nor were 
they able to introduce a cohesive plan for defense reform. Even though creation of the 
Armed Forces is often referred as one of the major accomplishments of Kravchuck’s 
presidency, the presence of a huge and redundant military segment also contributed to the 
economic catastrophe. 
 
Several issues aggravated problems with formulation of a national security policy. 
First, a potential territorial dispute with Russia over Crimea and Russian claims on the 
Black Sea Fleet and some other Soviet assets in the Ukrainian territory were causing 
ambivalence regarding the reduction of military personnel. Second, growing on the soil 
of economic stagnation and ethnic diversity, regionalism and even separatism (in Crimea) 
pushed the government to maintain large internal forces, i.e., police and the National 
Guard. Third, Ukraine inherited from the USSR the third largest arsenal of nuclear 
warheads in the world (after those of the USA and Russia). The initial declaration of a 
non-nuclear status by the Ukrainian parliament was welcomed by the international 
community and was a crucial factor for the international recognition of Ukraine. Yet 
Russian-Ukrainian tensions and economic crisis caused Ukrainian political elite to look at 
the nuclear weapons as an insurance against encroachments upon Ukrainian integrity and 
even upon economic security. Additionally, the issue was complicated by differences in 
vision by the parties involved (the USA, Russia and Ukraine) on the disarmament process 
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and the amount of financial compensation which Ukraine could receive if it would agree 
to forgo any nuclear aspirations.28 
 
In 1994, led by the top Crimean leadership and fueled by populists in the Russian 
parliament, separatists’ forces in Crimea mobilized considerable support from the 
population for some form of union with Russia.29 However, they did not receive any 
significant backing from the Russian government which they were counting on. On the 
other hand, the central government declared the Crimean officials’ actions as 
unconstitutional and competently applied economic leverage which allowed for 
resolution of the crisis without the use of force. At the same time the status of the Black 
Sea Fleet located in Crimea with the headquarters and main base in the city of Russian 
glory-Sevastopol-remained a problem. The parties were not able to reconcile the 
argument over the jurisdiction over the fleet, yet neither of them was eager to escalate 
further conflict. Ukraine appealed to the CIS treaty, according to which it owned all 
assets within its administrative boundaries at the moment of the dissolution of the USSR. 
Russia threatened to raise oil and gas prices or even shut down energy supplies due to the 
Ukrainian energy debt. Eventually, both countries agreed to divide the Black Sea Fleet 
50:50 and left the question of the status of the Russian portion outstanding. Despite the 
equitable agreement, Ukraine declared its intent to absorb as much of the fleet as required 
for its strategic needs, and then to sell the rest back to Russia.30 
 
Ukraine’s position on the nuclear weapons issue was shaped by several factors. 
Even though the Ukrainian state was only theoretically able to support strategic nuclear 
forces, it actively played its nuclear card in international politics. When the USA, Russia, 
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and Great Britain provided security guarantees demanded by Ukraine in exchange for 
non-nuclear status, the Ukrainian parliament ratified START 1 and the Nonproliferation 
Treaty on February 4, 1994. Additionally, the US agreed to pay for nuclear disarmament 
and doubled its aid to Ukraine.31 The decision to give up nuclear weapons not only 
significantly improved the international image of Ukraine, but also demonstrated the 
positive economic implications of a consistent national security strategy. 
 
In March 1994, Ukraine had its first parliamentary elections since it became 
independent. By then the Ukrainian parliament elected back in the Soviet era had lost 
much of its credibility and was regarded as an inefficient and corrupted institution. 
Despite widespread opinion that the 1990 elections did not accurately reflect the 
allocation of political preferences within the society, the Rada resisted holding a new 
election before the end of its four year term. Thus Ukraine lost a chance to elect reform-
oriented legislature during the so called “window of opportunity” following the 
banishment of the Communist party.  
 
The Verkhovna Rada was divided between conservatives from the former 
Communist party and a coalition of nationalists and reform-oriented deputies. Such a 
composition of political forces neither promoted national unity and civil consensus nor 
supported desperately needed economic reforms. In June 1993, facing growing 
resentment of the population, the Rada agreed to hold a referendum on confidence in the 
parliament and President Kravchuk in September of the same year. On 24 September 
1993, the parliament canceled the referendum in favor of early elections. The elections 
were to be held in March 1994 (parliamentary) and in June 1994 (presidential).32 
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Key issues which voters were concerned with on the eve of the 1994 
parliamentary elections were the economic crisis, crime, and relations with Russia. Only 
in Kyiv and Western Ukraine did potential voters identify as a priority the armed forces, 
territorial integrity and support for religion. Western Ukraine and the south around 
Odessa also supported economic reform as a high priority. In Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine and Crimea (the most populated industrial areas), the fight against crime was 
given top priority.33 Overall, both 1994 election campaigns were conducted against the 
background of societal distrust in the government and state institutions, as evidenced by 
the data in Table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1 Pre-election Poll of Public Confidence34 
 
Armed Forces 20% 
Militia (Police) 6% 
President  4% 
Cabinet of Ministers  2% 
Local Councils 2% 
  
The first round of the parliamentary elections was held in March-April 1994. 
Only 324 out of 450 representatives were elected.35 A highly confusing electoral law 
adopted in 1993 not only opened doors for numerous violations but also led to 
interminable run-offs to fill the vacant seats. A total of 393 deputies had been elected by 
September 1994. In the end, voter turnout was extremely low due to multiple and 
redundant polls which were inefficiently held. In some regions voters “suffered” from 
elections until March 1996 when the parliament came to the realization that Soviet-style 
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electoral system was not working and passed a one-year moratorium on by-elections in 
those areas which failed to elect a deputy twice owing to lack of a majority vote.36 
 
The Verkhovna Rada was divided into two camps over the question of reform 
with the conservative left wing, comprised of Communists, Socialists, Agrarians and 
some unaffiliated deputies, dominating the parliament (See table 2.2 for the political 
affiliation of the Ukrainian political parties in the 1994 convocation of the Verkhovna 
Rada). Nevertheless, the Rada found ways to cooperate over the key questions which 
divided voters during the election campaign. It peacefully resolved constitutional 
conflicts between the legislature and the executive branch37 which intensified in 1995 













                                                 




Table 2.2 Division of Parliament According to Political Orientation and Affiliation to 
Political Parties (5 April 1996)38 
 
Faction Membership Political Party 
Radical Left 
Communist 89 KPU 
Agrarians 26 SelPU 
Socialist 24 SPU 
Total 139 (33.41%)  
Social Democratic/Centrist/Liberal 
Center 31 None 
Social-Market Choice 30 LPU 
MRBR 29 MRBR 
Independents 25 None 
Agrarians for Reform 25 None 
Unity  24 None 
Total 164 (39.42%)  
Center-Right/Nationalist 
Reform 31 People’s Democratic Party 
of Ukraine & Rukh  
Statehood 29 URP & DPU 
Rukh 29 Rukh 
Total 89 (21.53%)  
 
The significance of the 1994 parliamentary elections was in the peaceful 
transition from a parliament elected in the Soviet era to the first parliament elected in the 
independent Ukraine, a factor that undoubtedly contributed to the country’s 
democratization. Also the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 was certainly 
the most positive achievement of the 1994 parliament. 
                                                 
38 Bohdan Harasymiw. Post-Communist Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002, 
p. 37. 
 24
1994 was rich in opportunities to further extend democratic processes in Ukraine. 
Seven candidates entered the presidential race before the June elections, two of which 
were clear favorites – then President Leonid Kravchuk and former Prime Minister Leonid 
Kuchma, backed by the Ukrainian industrial elite. In the second round, Kuchma won by 
52 per cent, with a 71 per cent turn-out.39  
 
Kuchma’s electoral platform included closer economic and political ties with 
Moscow and the need for implementing market reforms in Ukraine. However, his 
following two terms in the Presidential office proved that he was also listening to the 
wishes of twelve million voters mostly from the Western Ukraine and Kyiv who gave 
their ballots to nationalistic oriented Kravchuk.40 It was specifically reflected by the stand 
Kuchma took on the Ukraine’s defense and national security policies.  
 
Under Kuchma’s administration, Ukraine continued official policy on building up 
its own Armed Forces. However, a need to balance between the army’s requirements 
with the state’s abilities to satisfy them was pointed out by the Defense Minister Valery 
Shmarov, a civilian appointed by Kuchma shortly after elections. Shmarov was also in 
favor of improved bilateral military-technical co-operation with Russia. During 1995 the 
two countries signed several economic and technical agreements which provided for 
spare parts and technology for the AFU in exchange to a transfer or lease of some Soviet 
military equipment and facilities to Russia.41 
 
Kuchma’s presidency was accompanied by serious changes in foreign aspects of 
the national security agenda. Ukraine began to look for its place in the international 
security system. It increased, on a select basis, its participation in CIS defense structures; 
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overall, Ukraine continued to maintain minimal levels of co-operation. As opposed to 
that, under Kuchma, Ukraine adapted integrative policies towards NATO.42 Even before 
the elections, in February 1994, Ukraine joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, 
and during the next eight years, NATO-Ukraine relations culminated in a NATO-Ukraine 
Action Plan in 2002 which was aimed towards Ukraine’s eventual membership in the 
alliance. The co-operation with NATO and its impact on defense planning and budgeting 
in Ukraine will be discussed in Chapter IV. Here it is necessary to note that defense 
reform was a primary focus of the NATO-Ukraine relations since 1997 when they signed 
the NATO-Ukraine Partnership Charter on Distinctive Partnership.43 
 
In 1999, with difficult competition from the leftist candidates, Kuchma was re-
elected for his second term in the office. During his first tenure he launched privatization 
of state-owned assets and economic reforms. Both processes, however, were shaped in a 
way oriented to deliver benefits to a very narrow circle of individuals and clans close to 
those in power and did not bring significant improvement to the economy. Inflation and 
budget deficits were still high and GDP continued to decline. Parliamentary elections 
held before the presidential campaign in March 1998 were conducted under a new 
electoral law adopted in 1997 which lowered the requirement for a majority of electors to 
attend the polls from the previous 50 percent to 25 percent, and instituted a mixed 
electoral system. In the new parliament, 225 deputes were elected by proportional 
representation (PR) and 225 by simple plurality in single-member districts (SMD). On 
the PR side, parties were required to win 4 percent of the vote to receive representation.44 
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Out of thirty political parties registered for the elections, eight managed to attain 
the 4 per cent threshold. The Communists had a leading position with 24.7 percent of the 
vote, followed by Rukh (9.4 percent) and the Socialist Peasant block (8.6 percent). On the 
SMD side, the picture was different but not dramatically so. The big winners were the 
independents, who took 114 seats. The remaining seats were allocated among members 
of twenty one different parties. The Communists again had the strongest position, with 39 
seats. In the newly elected parliament deputies re-organized themselves into nine 
factions. The Communist party was a clear winner and had the largest faction of 119 
representatives or 28.8 percent of the total number. 45 The factional organization of the 
Ukrainian parliament elected in 1998 is represented in Table 2.3.   
 
Table 2.3 Registered Factions in the Parliament of Ukraine (14 May 1998)46  
  
Name Number of 
Deputies 
Percentage of Total 
Registered Deputies 
Communist Party of Ukraine 119 28.8 
PDP 84 20.3 
Rukh 47 11.4 
Hromada 39 9.4 
Left Center (Socialist Peasant Block) 35 8.5 
Green Party 24 5.8 
SDPU(O) 24 5.8 
Unaffiliated 24 5.8 
PSP 17 4.1 
 
The political composition of the new Verkhovna Rada appeared to be hostile to 
the executive branch. Although the anti-presidential wing did not have an overwhelming 
majority to pass a vote of non-confidence in the government, they took extremely 
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aggressive and implacable stands towards the executive. Not only did they sabotage the 
work of the government by persistent blocking of bills and budget proposals, they also 
came into open confrontation with the presidency when the Rada “issued an appeal to the 
Ukrainian people in October 1999, urging them not to vote during the presidential 
election for the incumbent Leonid Kuchma in order to insure democracy”.47 
 
After Kuchma’s victory in the second round of the presidential election, pro-
governmental forces managed to organize a majority in the parliament. Yet it was not to 
last. The government enjoyed parliamentary cooperation until the end of 2000 and was 
able to get several key measures approved. Even the 2001 budget was passed by the Rada 
before the start of the new year (for the first time since Soviet era). However, then the 
presidential majority disintegrated and the parliament again became belligerent to the 
government.48  
 
A short “honeymoon” of two governmental institutions produced the first 
economic improvement since 1991. Appointed by Kuchma, a new Prime Minister Victor 
Yushchenko introduced a set of measures which eliminated some shadow economic 
schemes and made monetary mechanisms work. These policies brought a 6 percent GDP 
growth in 200049 and ensured steady increases thereafter.50 Despite these achievements, 
Yushchenko was forced out of office when his rising popularity made him a threat to the 
president and the clan of businessmen around him.51 The interests of Kuchma, concerned 
with preservation of the power, coincided with the populist aims of the Communist 
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coalition in the parliament which criticized Yushchenko for his pro-western orientation 
and voted to remove him in April 2001.52 
     
During his ten year presidency, Kuchma was working with three convocations of 
the Verkhovna Rada. The third one was elected in March 2002 and was the first Rada 
where the communists did not have the largest faction. Yushchenko was able to use the 
interval between his dismissal and parliamentary elections to organize his electoral block, 
“Our Ukraine”, which obtained 110 seats in the new parliament, more than any other 
party.  
 
Table 2.4 The Official Election Results (31 March 2002)53 
 
Political Parties % of vote Number of 
seats (PR) 




Our Ukraine 23.7 70 40 110 
Communist Party 99.98 59 7 66 
For a United Ukraine 11.77 35 66 101 
Timoshenko Block 7.26 22 -- 22 
Socialist Party 6.87 20 2 22 
SDPU (O) 6.27 19 5 24 










Block “Unity” 1.09 -- 3 3 















Ukrainian Sea Party 0.11 -- 1 1 
Independents -- -- 93 93 
Total -- 225 222 447 
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The Verkhovna Rada of 2002 was more fragmented than ever before (See Table 
2.4 for the list of the political parties represented in the Ukrainian parliament of 2002). 
The presidential administration faced two oppositions–the communists and the shaky 
coalition of Socialists, the Timoshenko Block and Yushchnko’s Our Ukraine. The 
former, however, regarded Kuchma as a smaller evil than “pro-western and nationalistic” 
Yushchenko and his ally Timoshenko. Divisions also took place even within the 
opposition camps, which had a dramatic effect over the course of the constitutional 
reform preemptively launched by the president to weaken Yushchenko in case of his 
victory in presidential elections in 2004.  With support from Socialists and the 
Communist Party, the president’s camp was able to pass the reform which provided for a 
proportional representative electoral system and transferred some presidential powers to 
the parliament and prime minister.54  
 
To summarize, since 1992 Ukrainian governmental institutions were involved in a 
contest for power initially aggravated by the absence of a new constitution which might 
have provided guidelines for democratic behavior. The Armed Forces were definitely not 
involved as they proved themselves a politically neutral, stable and reliable institution. 
Yet defense and security issues appeared to be an important variable in Ukrainian 
international politics. It was the international security environment and economy which 
dictated a need for structured defense planning. The next section will summarize the 
development of the AFU from 1991 to 2005 and assess the financial aspects of this 
process.   
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE 
Confronted with a potentially dangerous situation after the break up of the Soviet 
Union, the Ukrainian government managed to maintain moderate political stability and to 
avoid the ethnic and regional conflicts which broke out in a number of former Soviet 
republics. An important constituent of this success came from the ability to reorganize 
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approximately 780,00055 former Soviet troops into a Ukrainian Army. Nationalization of 
almost the entire (with the exception of the Black Sea Fleet) portion of the Soviet military 
machine in Ukrainian territory did prevent the continued presence of Russian military 
bases in Ukraine, an essential factor in the event of domestic strife and separatist 
initiatives.56  
 
In accordance with the Soviet military-administrative organization, Ukraine was 
divided into three military districts which altogether had one rocket army, three armies of 
combined forces and two tank armies, one army corps, four Air Force armies, and a 
separate Air Defense army. Additionally, the Black See fleet was stationed in Crimea and 
in several other Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Thus Ukraine inherited more than enough 
resources to equip a large armed force. In 1991 it had 6500 tanks, about 7000 combat 
armored vehicles, 1500 combat aircrafts, more than 350 ships, 1272 strategic nuclear 
warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 2500 tactical nuclear missiles.57  
 
This defense “heritage” was obviously unsuited for Ukraine’s independent needs. 
By October 1991, the Verkhovna Rada had established much of the legal basis for setting 
up Ukraine’s own armed forces. Although a need for downsizing and military reform was 
recognized by the Ukrainian leadership, external as well as internal security 
considerations prohibited the introduction of profound measures. Resistance to radical 
military reform can be explained by two main reasons. First, possession of a large 
military and nuclear weapons might prevent possible encroachments upon Ukrainian 
territorial integrity. Second, the Ukrainian leadership strived for stability within the large 
officer corps which could be disturbed by the cuts. Thus the first stage of the AFU 
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development may be regarded mostly as a nationalization or initial establishment of the 
Armed Forces.  
 
However, actively establishing itself as a European country and a member of the 
international community, Ukraine was determined to observe its international obligations. 
In accordance with the requirements of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and 
under an agreement signed in May 1992 as a member of the CIS, Ukraine began to 
reduce the number of both weapons and personnel.58 The economic crisis which the 
Ukrainian MOD was facing from the first days of its existence accelerated the rate of 
reduction.59 By 1996, Ukraine had cut its military personnel to 400,800,60 driven by the 
same considerations that led the Ukrainian parliament to abandon nuclear weapons, i.e., 
they not only carried prohibitively high costs but were also an obstacle to receiving 
international financial aid. 
 
However, except for the reduction of forces, little had been done to implement 
reform. In 1992-1995, Ukrainian armed forces remained basically the same as the Soviet 
model from which they had originated in their organization.61 Chronic underfunding 
meant that such a structure was unable to carry out its tasks and was a great burden for 
the state budget. The evidence of a crisis was obvious: not a single exercise at divisional 
level had been held since 1991. By 1995, 40 percent of Ukraine’s fighter aircraft were out 
of operation because of shortages of fuel and spare parts. Pilots and tank drivers only 
trained at 20-30 percent of the required minimum in their field. Similar problems were 
                                                 
58 Bohdan Harasymiw. Post-Communist Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002, 
p. 403.  
59 Konstiantyn Morozov. Above and Beyond: From Soviet General to Ukrainian State Builder. 
Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 217. 
60 Active duty servicemen and women (including conscripts and long-term assignments from reserve). 
Source: The Military Balance 1996/97. Oxford University Press, 1996, p.101.  
61 Taras Kuzio. Crisis and Reform in Ukraine – Part 2. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 November 1996, 
Volume 008/011, p. 496. Internet. Online. Available http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp (19 March 
2006). 
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evident for literally all components and aspects of combat preparation. Even staff 
activities could not be carried out properly because power supplies and communication 
lines were often switched off by providers due to non-payment of debts.62 
 
The appointment of Valery Shmarov as a civilian minister of defense was made 
by President Kuchma in 1994, simultaneously with the introduction of market reforms 
and privatization. It was aimed to bring developments within the MOD in line with the 
governmental economic program. In addition, a new administration was reassessing 
Ukraine’s threat environment which had to be reflected by the defense reform. Shmarov’s 
proposed reform program met resistance from a group of top military leadership led by 
chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Lopata. The program called for cardinal restructuring 
of the AFU (corps-brigade and regional command structure as opposed to existing 
division-regiment and military district structure), further cuts in personnel and a number 
of other measures including a new system of operational strategic planning. Lopata was 
advocating the existing structure of the Armed Forces and argued for the need to possess 
sufficient forces and armaments to obtain victory over the enemy–not merely to rebuff 
him.63 At the same time, the General Staff lobbied parliamentary factions on the issue of 
troop reductions.64 Lack of clear division of functions between the MOD and the General 
Staff became especially apparent during the conflict of civilian and military authorities 
and worsened the issue. When the argument became public, both the Minister of Defense 
and the Chief of General Staff were dismissed by the President.  
 
                                                 
62 Taras Kuzio. Crisis and Reform in Ukraine – Part 1. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 October 1996, 
Volume 008/010, p. 448. Internet. Online. Available http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp  (19 March 
2006).   
63 Taras Kuzio. Crisis and Reform in Ukraine – Part 2. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 November 1996, 
Volume 008/011, p. 496. Internet. Online. Available  http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp  (19 March 
2006).  
64 Pavel Baev. Europe, Ukraine's Army under Civilian Rule, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 January 
1996, Volume 008/001, p. 8. Internet. Online. Available http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp  (19 March 
2006). 
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A new program for the further development of the armed forces to the year 2005 
adopted by the government at the end of 1996 appeared to be a compromise between the 
two conflicting approaches. The program took into account Ukraine’s economic 
conditions and the current international context. It retained the existing force structure – 
land forces, navy, air force and air defense – but replaced the Soviet era military districts 
with three operational commands – western, northern and southern.65 The appointment of 
Lieutenant General Olexander Kuzmuk, previously commander of the National Guard, to 
replace Shmarov articulated Kuchma’s intend to continue defense reforms but 
emphasized that it may been too early for civilian control of the armed forces.  
 
Meanwhile, increasing social costs threatened the defense reform. Social 
legislation, designed to attract military officers to the Ukrainian armed forces in 1992-
1993, became a significant problem for the implementation of the reform. For example, a 
number of officers could not be released from the service without apartments being 
allocated for them, therefore posing a burden for the defense budget.66 It also was less 
stressful for the budget to pay them regular salaries than the considerable retirement 
benefit packages to which they were entitled in case of dismissal due to downsizing.  
 
But the most significant impact on the defense reform was made by the 
government when it substantially cut funding of the defense sector six months after the 
introduction of the reform program. As a result, during the first stage of the reform 
(1997-99), the MOD could only afford actions which required no or few funds (see table 
2.5).67 In September 1997, President Kuchma asked the parliament for a two-fold 
                                                 
65 Bohdan Harasymiw. Post-Communist Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002, 
p. 409.  
66 Taras Kuzio. Crisis and Reform in Ukraine – Part 1. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 October 1996, 
Volume 008/010, p. 448. Internet. Online. Available  http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp  (19 March 
2006).  
67 National Security and Defense. January 2000, p. 21. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/?cur_nomer=1  (19 March 2006). 
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increase in defense spending purposely for the implementation of the reforms.68 The 
MOD, however, obtained only an 8 percent increase in nominal hryvnias in 199869 which 
was hardly enough to cover inflation70 and suggested that defense reform was not a 
priority for the Verkhovna Rada.  Moreover, the defense spending was also reduced by 
the Ministry of Finance so that Ukraine could qualify for the loans from the IMF, which 
required cuts in government expenditure.71 Table 2.5 demonstrates dynamics of the 
defense funding as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 2.5 Funding of Ukraine’s Armed Forces 1992-9972 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Defense Budget,  
% of GDP 
2.4 1.57 1.46 1.8 1.9 1.35 1.35 1.4 
 
Similar trends remained until 2004; furthermore, real allocations of funds to the 
MOD were actually below budget figures even after the beginning of growth of the 
economy in 2000.  Figure 2.1 indicates a large and persistent gap between requirements 
for defense spending and actual expenditure between 2000 and 2005. For purposes of this 
figure, “required” and “minimum required” budgets are interpreted as the defense budget 
requirements submitted by the MOD.   
 
                                                 
68 Kiev Seeks Spending Increase to Meet Reforms. Jane's Defense Weekly, 3 September 1997. 
Internet. Online. Available http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp  (19 March 2006). 
69 The data obtained from calculations based on Ukraine’s 1997 and 1998 budgets. 1997 law on the 
state budget of Ukraine available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi , 1998 law available 
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi   (19 March 2006). 
70 Inflation data obtained from http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Inflation/World-
Inflation/index.cfm#chart  (19 March 2006). 
71 Avoid Ukraine. Foreign Report. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 25 February 1998, Volume 000/2533. 
Internet. Online. Available http://jir.janes.com/docs/jir/search.jsp  (19 March 2006).   
72 National Security and Defense. January 2000, p. 21. Internet. Online. Available 
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Figure 2.1 Funding of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2000-2005, UAH millions73 
  
 In 2000 the plans for the defense reform were corrected and a new “State 
Program for Reform and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine” was adopted. This 
program was developed for the period from 2000 to 2005 and took into account changes 
that occurred in Ukraine and in the world at the end of the 20th century. A brief overview 
of this program and the results of its implementation in regard to defense planning and 
budgeting will be provided in Chapter IV. Overall the 2000 program for defense reform 
provided for improvements in defense legislation, in the structure of the Armed Forces 
and in their operational control system. It included further reduction of personnel and 
equipment, enhancement of the combat preparation system, and a shift to manning on a 
contract basis. 
 
 However, the situation in the Armed Forces continued to deteriorate. Out of all 
main objectives of the reform program, the only notable progress was made by the MOD 
and the Verkhovna Rada in terms of adoption of a sufficient legal base for the 
functioning of the Armed Forces in a changing political environment. These new laws 
                                                 
73 The White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine. Kyiv, 2006, p.99. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/ua/white_book/1.pdf  (19 March 2006).  
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included amendments to legislation on social protection of military personnel and 
additional options which were made available to personnel in 2004. It gave greater 
flexibility to the MOD and allowed accelerated downsizing of the Armed Forces. By the 
end of 2005, the number of active duty personnel was reduced to 180,000.74 The year 
2005 was also notable because it was the first year when the Ukrainian MOD received 
the full amount of funds allocated by the budget, which allowed Ukrainian defense 
officials and President Yushchenko to talk about a qualitative shift in the defense reform 
and about a budget of development for 2006.    
D. CONCLUSIONS  
Although Ukrainian policymakers learned from early Ukrainian history and 
devoted considerable effort to the creation of the armed forces, little has been done to 
sustain the initial success. The first initiatives stemmed from the ambiguity of the 
external threats to the Ukrainian statehood and the importance of control over the armed 
forces to prove the very validity of a new government. In addition, legislative attention to 
the military was necessary to ensure internal stability since military personnel and family 
members were a significant portion of the Ukraine’s fifty two million population and the 
armed forces possessed enough material and organizational resources to destabilize the 
country.  
 
However, the effective work which had been done by the government to fulfill 
these objectives did not result in the originally planned building of the Ukrainian armed 
forces on the principles of “a substantiated adequacy of the numerical force and structure 
as well as of the equipment”75 to meet the strategic needs of Ukraine and its ability to 
support the military.  As the factors initially pursued to stabilize and modernize the 
military became less relevant and the deteriorating economy became a primary concern 
 
                                                 
74The White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine. Kyiv, 2006, p.13. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/ua/white_book/1.pdf  (19 March 2006).  
75 The Conception of Defense and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 10. 11. 1991. 
Internet. Online. Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=a#Find (1 April 2006).  
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of the population, the government essentially abandoned the Armed Forces. This attitude 
towards defense was shown by the extremely low defense budgets during the period 
1992-2004.  
 
Equally negative for the development of the armed forces was the absence of a 
consolidated national security agenda and correspondingly, the lack of a cohesive defense 
reform plan to use those scarce resources efficiently. The composition of the Verkhovna 
Rada was too fragmented to come to a common opinion on this matter. Moreover, the 
Rada’s role in the decision-making process was rather limited in comparison with that of 
the President, which consequently provided few incentives for the parliament to be 
involved in defense processes. Basic needs of the Armed Forces were largely neglected, 
as the legislative and the executive branches of the government were preoccupied with a 
contest for power. Until 2004, Ukrainian defense reform consisted of the downsizing of 
the military caused by the economic crisis and international obligations of Ukraine. The 
next chapter will describe how the Ukrainian legal mechanisms were designed to support 
the national defense. It will discuss the evolution of the defense budget process in 
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III. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND THE DEFENSE 
BUDGET PROCESS, 1991 – 2004 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Under the Soviet Union, defense was a prerogative of the central Soviet 
government, as a result of which, neither the Ministry of Defense nor the General Staff 
had branches in the republics. Defense activities were financed entirely from the union 
budget. Even though “strengthening of the defense capability of the country” was among 
the functions to be executed according to plan and budget by provincial governments at 
all levels, locally financed projects (e.g., aerodromes of local importance) and other 
expenditures (e.g., promotion of physical culture) had minor or indirect significance for 
defense overall.76 
 
The first Law on the State Budget of Ukraine was passed by the Verkhovna Rada 
in 1992. Defense expenditures in that document were represented by a single number 
which combined funds allocated to the MOD, the National Guard, the Border Troops, the 
Staff of Civil Defense, and the educational organizations of the Society for Assistance the 
Defense of Ukraine. It is not clear how the shares of this “security” budget were allocated 
among the individual agencies, and how priorities were set. Progress in defense budget 
legislation is demonstrated by the fact that the defense budget in 2004 was subdivided 
among 28 programs. The third chapter of this thesis will discuss formal aspects of the 
evolution of budgeting for defense in Ukraine. It will examine who had power to decide 
how much funding national defense would receive, and how it was affected by legal 
developments such as introduction of the Constitution in 1996.  
 
This chapter consists of three main sections. First, it will describe the evolution of 
the defense budget process from 1991 to 1996. It will then discuss budgeting for defense 
after the introduction of the Constitution and Budget Code in the period from 1997 to 
                                                 
76 Raymond Hutchings. The Soviet Budget. State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 42-43. 
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2004. Finally, the Role of the Verkhovna Rada in the processes of defense planning and 
control over the execution of the defense budget will be considered.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY DURING THE 
PERIOD FROM 1991 TO 1996 
During the period from 1991 to 1996, the Ukrainian budget system was regulated 
by the Law on the Budget System of Ukraine passed by the Verkhovna Rada in 
December 1990.77 Adoption of this law, on one hand, was intended to emphasize 
separation from the union budget system. On the other hand, it was the first attempt to 
separate the powers and responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches of the 
government.78 It provided basic principles and guidelines for the development of the state 
budget and envisaged defense as a separate and distinct category of the budget. 
According to Article 7 of the 1990 version of the Law on the Budget System of Ukraine, 
the Council of Ministers “submits to the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) projects of: 
• The budget for the republic with explication of the main sources of income 
and main categories of expenditure; 
• The proposal for the amount of circulating cash in the budget for the 
republic”.79 
In accordance with the same article, a procedure and terms for the development of 




                                                 
77 This law was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 5 
December 1990 and (as amended in 1995) remained in force through 21 June 2001, when the Budget Code 
of Ukraine was adopted. 
78 Program of Assistance for the Parliament of Ukraine. The University of Indiana. Budget and 
Financial Authorities of the Verkhovna Rada. Internet. Online. Available 
http://pdp.org.ua/prn_view.php?a=184 (13 April 2006).  
79 Ibid. 
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Article 8 stipulated the role of the Verkhovna Rada in the budget process. In 
particular it stated:  
The project of the budget for the republic, submitted by the Council of 
Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, is preliminarily examined by the 
Commission on Planning, Budget, Finances, and Prices and by other 
standing commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR.  
After the examination, the standing commissions prepare and present their 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The Verkhovna Rada approves:  
• The amount of circulating cash in the republican budget; 
• The ceiling of the budget deficit and sources for its 
compensation.80 
The function of oversight over execution of the budget of the Ukrainian SSR, in 
accordance with this law, was entrusted to the same entity which was responsible for the 
execution of the budget-the Council of Ministers.81  
 
As a result, the very essence and form of the 1990 Law on the Budgeting System 
of Ukraine practically excluded real parliamentary oversight over its execution. The 
articles of the budget were represented by very large sums, without clarification of 
particular categories of spending. As a result, government ministries and agencies could 
and did spend budget funds without consideration of parliamentary priority. At that time 
Ukraine had no legislation or other regulations designed to provide order and 
transparency to governmental expenditure. Consequently, ministries and agencies, as well 
as individual government officials, were not held accountable for the use of budget 
funds.82 
                                                 
80 Program of Assistance for the Parliament of Ukraine. The University of Indiana. Budget and 
Financial Authorities of the Verkhovna Rada. Internet. Online. Available 
http://pdp.org.ua/prn_view.php?a=184 (13 April 2006). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid.  
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In 1990, an attempt was made to impose parliamentary control over the execution 
of the budget by the Rada. The Ukrainian parliament declared the intent of Ukraine to 
have its own armed forces in the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, passed 
on 16 July 1990. The first document which had practical significance for the development 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was the Conception of Defense and Development of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine, adopted in October 1991, following the independence of 
Ukraine proclaimed on 24 August 1991 (See Chapter II). This document had several 
provisions regarding financing of the military.  
 
In particular, it provided that “obsolete equipment which the units of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine are armed with, and location of many maintenance facilities outside of 
Ukraine require considerable budget funds for defense and development of own military 
production”. 83 It then assigned the right to approve the defense budget and to control its 
execution to the Verkhovna Rada. It also stipulated roles of the President, the Ministry of 
Defense, and the General Staff in the defense planning and control over the military, and 
provided for the Defense Council of Ukraine to be the highest government body to 
control national security and the defense sphere in Ukraine. The composition of the 
Defense Council had to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada. However, the role in 
budgeting for defense was not specified for either of these bodies. 
  
A separate section of the document was called “Financial-Economic Support” (to 
the AFU). With respect to the budget, it stated that “Military reform and development of 
the Armed Forces of Ukraine required new approaches to the formation of defense 
budget during the period of transition to the market economy”. 84 Specification of those 
“new approaches” was not provided. It also stated that the AFU were to be funded  
                                                 
83 The Conception of Defense and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 10. 11. 1991. 
Internet. Online. Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=a#Find (6 April 2006).  
84 Ibid. 
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entirely from the state budget and the amount of funds was based on the number of 
troops, “which should not exceed 0.8-0.9 per cent of the population (400-420 
thousand)”.85 
 
The notion that the defense budget was to be a function of the number of troops 
illustrates an ambiguity within the Conception of Defense and Development of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine. First, because the population of Ukraine in 1991 was 51.7 
million,86 one tenth of a percent represents a very large range. Second, the range 400-420 
thousand troops provided by the Conception does not match the 0.8-0.9 percent range, 
which should be 410-460 thousand. Finally, the funding of the Armed Forces based on 
the number of troops does not correspond with the need for modernization of military 
doctrine and equipment which were also stressed in the document. 
 
The declarative nature and ambiguity of the Conception of Defense and 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be explained by the character of the 
historical period during which it was adopted (See Chapter II). Rapidly unfolding events 
and lack of expertise in the national security realm did not allow for development of 
sophisticated legal acts. Although the Conception of Defense and Development cannot 
pretend to be called the first program for development or reform of the Ukrainian armed 
forces-which in fact, did not officially exist until 6 December 1991-this document was 
extremely important to support efforts to nationalize the military, especially as it 
expressed the commitment of the new government to develop and finance defense. 
 
                                                 
85 The Conception of Defense and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 10. 11. 1991. 
Internet. Online. Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?user=a#Find (6 April 2006).  
86 Statistical data was obtained from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. Internet. Online. 
Available http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbprint.html  (4 April 2006). See also State Committee of 
Statistics of Ukraine. Internet. Online. Available http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua  (4 April 2006). 
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A package of legal acts, passed by the Rada on 6 December 1991, set a legal 
precedent for the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It was comprised of the 
laws of Ukraine on the Armed Forces of Ukraine and on the Defense of Ukraine. The 
Law on the Defense of Ukraine established legal principles for the defense of Ukraine 
and regulated authorities and responsibilities of governmental agencies, organizations, 
officials and individual citizens in the defense sphere. Regarding funding of defense, it 
stated that “the needs of the national defense of the state shall be financed solely at the 
expense of the State Budget of Ukraine within limits annually set by the Law of Ukraine 
‘On the State Budget of Ukraine’ providing for proper accomplishment of defense tasks, 
but no less than three per cent of the planned gross domestic product volume.”87 
 
Although this law set a minimum of three percent of GDP for defense spending, it 
did not explain which categories of the budget expenditures belong to defense. Absent 
this clarification, officials from the Ministry of Finance could argue that the three percent 
limit should include all categories attributed to defense by effective law, including 
pensions for retired military personnel. One expert concluded that “Such a situation 
causes heated discussions in the Verkhovna Rada every year in the process of the defense 
budget approval, and in the end often, makes the amount of defense expenditures 
unpredictable.”88  
 
Since its adoption, the Law on the Defense of Ukraine has been amended several 
times. Because only the latest version of this law89 was available during the writing of 
                                                 
87 This translation was taken from: Polyakov, Leonid. An Analytical Overview of Democratic 
Oversight and Governance of the Defense and Security Sector in Ukraine. Geneva, January, 2005, p. 41. 
Internet. Online. Available http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/152.pdf   (4 April 2006). 
88 Leonid Polyakov. An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and Governance of the 
Defense and Security Sector in Ukraine. Geneva, January, 2005, p. 41. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/152.pdf  (4 April 2006). 
89 The version from 5 October 2000. Internet. Online. Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=1932%2D12&text=%EF%F0%EE+%EE%E1%EE%F0%EE%ED%F3  (6 April 
2006). 
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this thesis, this section will provide only a general overview of the implications of the 
Law on the Defense of Ukraine. In particular, the law provided the following: 
 
1) The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine determines the need for defense funding and 
provides for execution of  the portion of the State Budget of Ukraine approved by the 
Verkhovna Rada regarding the defense sphere; 
2) The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine participates in the development of the defense 
budget and reports to the Cabinet of  Ministers of Ukraine on the use of the 
appropriated funds; and, 
3) The General Staff determines the need for personnel, armaments and equipment and 
for other resources (including financial resources) necessary for proper 
accomplishment of tasks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military 
structures, and controls receiving of these resources. 
 
The law also provides for the coordination and control role for the National 
Security and Defense Council which was introduced by the Law on the National Security 
and Defense Council in 1998. This body will be discussed in the next section, as well as 
the roles of the Verkhovna Rada and the President which are referred to the Constitution 
of Ukraine introduced in 1996.  
 
The Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine deals specifically with the AFU and 
determines their functions, structure, and the legal basis for their organization, 
functioning, location and control.  Financing of the Armed Forces is defined in very 
general terms in this law. It indicates that the Armed Forces of Ukraine shall be financed 
at the expense of the State Budget of Ukraine and that control over execution of the State 
Budget regarding financing of the AFU is conducted in accordance with “a legal 
procedure”. However this procedure is not defined within the law. Interestingly, the Law 
on the Armed Forces of Ukraine also says that “expenses of the MOD to carry out its 
tasks … are financed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine at the expense of the funds 
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appropriated for these tasks by the legal procedure, or additional funds (inpayments).” 
This statement appears to contradict the Law on Defense of Ukraine by providing for the 
possibility to fund defense by means other than “solely at the expense of the State Budget 
of Ukraine.”90 
 
Altogether, from 1991 to 1996, the three legal acts discussed above comprised the 
main body of Ukrainian defense legislation. Consequently, the legal aspects of budgeting 
for defense were not developed during this period. This allows one to conclude that the 
defense budget process was basically regulated by rules produced within the executive 
branch of the government and within the MOD in particular. The idea of the Defense 
Council found in the Conception of Defense and Development of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine was not implemented in reality. Therefore, the Verkhovna Rada did not develop 
its initiative to assume the coordinative role in the defense process. 
 
The structure of defense expenditures in Ukrainian budgets from 1992 to 1995 
consisted of the expenses for the MOD, the National Guard, the Border Troops, and for 
the Staff and Troops of Civil Defense. This structure did not undergo any significant 
change during this period. In 1992, the defense budget, as already noted, was a single 
number for all these security structures;91 however, budgets from 1993 to 1995 were not 
much different, in that defense budgets consisted of a single sum assigned to each 
organization. 
 
Even though it is hard to assess the effectiveness of the process which the 
government was using to plan and execute defense budgets without having access to the 
actual documents, the apparent degradation of the Ukrainian defense capabilities in the 
                                                 
90 The Law on Defense of Ukraine. Internet. Online. Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=1932%2D12&text=%EF%F0%EE+%EE%E1%EE%F0%EE%ED%F3  (10 April 
2006). 
91 In addition to this, the 1992 defense budget included the educational organizations of the Society of 
Assistance for the Defense of Ukraine.  
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mid 1990s suggests that defense should have been given more attention by the 
government including legislative elaboration of the defense planning and budgeting 
processes. The next section will discuss further development of the legal basis for 
budgeting for defense in Ukraine. 
C. GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM AND BUDGET PROCESS DURING THE 
PERIOD FROM 1996 TO 2004 
In June 1995, the Law on the Budget System of Ukraine was amended to 
strengthen the role of the Rada in the development and execution of the state budget, and 
to provide for more transparency in the budget.92 For example, a requirement for detailed 
clarification of any budgetary item which exceeded 0.1 per cent of total State budget 
spending was included. However, it took several years to implement these changes within 
actual budgets. 
 
The introduction of the Constitution of Ukraine in June 1996 and the Budget 
Code of Ukraine, which replaced the Law on the Budget System of Ukraine in June 2001, 
affected the Ukrainian budget system and budgeting for defense in particular. This 
section will describe the defense budget process as it was shaped by these developments 
and by other initiatives intended to enhance budgeting for Ukraine.  
1. Structure of the Defense Budget, 1996-2004 
Before discussing the process of developing the defense budget within the 
government and the Ministry of Defense, the structure of defense expenditure should be 
examined. Beginning in 1996 the part of the Ukrainian state budget called National 
Defense included only funds spent by or through the Ministry of Defense. Until 1999 
they were segmented in a few basic categories such as maintenance of the AFU,93 
procurement, research and development, and several other categories which differed from 
year to year.  
                                                 
92 Program of Assistance for the Parliament of Ukraine. The University of Indiana. Budget and 
Financial Authorities of the Verkhovna Rada. Internet. Online. Available 
http://pdp.org.ua/prn_view.php?a=184 (13 April 2006). 
93 “Maintenance” included all kinds of day-to-day support. 
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A resolution of the Verkhovna Rada passed in July 1996 introduced a system of 
budget expenditure classifications. However, it was not until 1999 that the State Budget 
actually took more detailed form. In accordance with the functional classification of the 
budget, defense expenditures were subdivided into six major categories, some of which 
were additionally portioned into subcategories. The structure of defense budgets from 
1999 to 2001 is represented in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 General Structure of Defense Budgets, 1999-200194 
                                                 
94 Source: Developed from data found on the website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Laws on the 
State Budget of Ukraine, 1999-2001). Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi  (16 April 
2006). 
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The next important development was the introduction of program budgeting in the 
2002 budget. The essence of program budgeting was a transition from budgeting by 
organization to an emphasis on real results from the use of budget funds. In order to 
measure and estimate these results, budget expenditures should be approved as a budget 
programs that had a unit responsible for execution, goals, and performance criteria. Due 
to the development of a state program budget structure, based on which the 2002 budget 
was prepared, functional budget expenditure classification was intended to become an 
analytical and statistical tool used for consolidated budget formulation, macroeconomic 
forecasting and international budget comparisons.95  
 
The structure of the defense budget from 2002 to 2004 did not remain exactly the 
same. Some programs were removed or added, but the basic format prevailed. The 
general structure of defense budgets during this period is represented in Figure 3.2. 
Therefore, with the introduction of program budgeting, the Law on the State Budget of 
Ukraine became an instrument to reveal the main financial implications of the 
governmental defense policy. This progress was initiated by the legislature and was to be 
implemented by all participants of the budget process. However, the MOD did little to 
improve its internal budgeting procedures, as will be illustrated by the description of the 







                                                 
95 The 2002 Budget in Brief: Ukraine. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Technical 
Assistance. Internet. Online. Available http://www.ustreasury.hu/budget/documents/ukr_budg_brief.pdf  
(14 April 2006).  
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96 Source: Developed from data found on the website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Laws on the 
State Budget of Ukraine, 2002-2004). Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi  (16 April 
2006). 
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2. Development of the Defense Budget within the Ministry of Defense 
and Activities within the Government97 
The processes of financial planning and budgeting within the MOD are carried 
out under the coordination and supervision of the Chief Financial and Economic 
Directorate (CFED). It is included in the organizational structure of the Central Office of 
the MOD (COMOD) and subordinated directly to the Minister of Defense. The CFED is 
the executive body through which the defense minister exercises his authority over 
spending budget funds. 
 
The MOD budget process is designed to meet the requirements of the Budget 
Code and provide the Cabinet of Ministers with a defense budget proposal on a timely 
basis. To achieve these objectives, the following procedure is employed.  
   
The Budget Code of Ukraine provides the time frame and other requirements for 
all participants in the budget process.  In addition to this, a resolution is issued annually 
by the Cabinet, as well as recommendations by the Ministry of Economy and European 
Integration. These documents set targets and limits, and provide guidelines for the 
development of planning documents. In accordance with these guidelines, the MOD 
releases papers which regulate the budget process within the defense ministry.  
 
Subordinate directorates of the COMOD submit their budget estimates to the 
CFED at the designated time. The CFED revises these estimates, determines MOD’s 
financial requirements for the upcoming year, and prepares consolidated estimates of the 
MOD’s income and expenses. The MOD budget request is then reported to the Minister 
of Defense.  
 
                                                 
97 This subsection was developed based on the information provided on the Ministry of Defense of 
Ukraine’s website: MOD Chief Financial and Economic Directorate, Financial Planning. Internet. Online. 
Available http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=department&lang=ua&sub=gfeu  (12 April 2006).  
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Once it is approved by the Minister of Defense, the budget request is submitted to 
the Ministry of Finance for revision and standardization. It then becomes a part of the 
Cabinet’s budget proposal which is presented to the President and to the parliament’s 
budget committee for final scrutiny. After considering remarks submitted by the 
President and the Budget Committee, a proposed Law on the State Budget of Ukraine is 
submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers to the Verkhovna Rada for readings and approval.  
3. Budgeting for Defense within the Parliament 
Budgeting activities within the Verkhovna Rada are regulated by the three basic 
documents: the Constitution, the Budget Code, and the Procedural Regulations of the 
Verkhovna Rada. This subsection will review the budget process as it is conducted by the 
parliament and discuss the arrangements within the Verkhovna Rada designed to budget 
for defense.   
 
Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, adopted on 28 June 1996, contains key 
powers of the Verkhovna Rada. Perhaps, the most important of such powers is the right 
of “approving the State Budget of Ukraine and introducing amendments to it; controlling 
the implementation of the State Budget of Ukraine and adopting decisions in regard to the 
report on its implementation.”98  
 
The budget cycle for the upcoming year in the Verkhovna Rada begins after 
approval of the presidential report on the implementation of the previous year’s budget. 
Based on this report and a socioeconomic forecast for the upcoming year, standing 
committees of the Verkhovna Rada develop recommendations regarding the future 
budget and send them to the Budget Committee no later than 20 May of the current year.  
 
                                                 
98 This translation was taken from: Leonid Polyakov. An Analytical Overview of Democratic 
Oversight and Governance of the Defense and Security Sector in Ukraine. Geneva, January, 2005, p. 24. 
Internet. Online. Available http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/152.pdf   (4 April 2006). 
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The Budget Committee develops a proposed Budget Resolution for the upcoming 
year and submits it to the Verkhovna Rada no later than 15 June of the current year. The 
Budget Resolution emphasizes the budget policy priorities for the upcoming year and 
provides guidelines for the development of the budget proposal to the government of 
Ukraine and for consideration of the budget and other laws which affect the flow of the 
budget funds to the Verkhovna Rada. The Budget Resolution is to be passed by the Rada 
no later than 1 July. No law regarding fiscal policy or budget spending for the upcoming 
year may be adopted by the parliament before the Budget Resolution is approved. 
 
Pursuant to the Constitution of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers submits a 
proposed Law on the State Budget of Ukraine for the upcoming year no later than 15 
September. A report on the implementation of the State Budget of Ukraine for the current 
year is submitted to the Rada, together with this project.  
 
The budget proposal is presented to the parliament by the Minister of Finance. It 
is then considered by the standing committees which provide their amendments to the 
Budget Committee. If a committee or a deputy proposes an increase in spending or a 
decrease in revenues, they are obligated to propose a corresponding increase from other 
sources or a cut in spending for other items.  
 
The Budget Committee considers amendments in accordance with the Procedural 
Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada and prepares its report. The report of the Budget 
Committee opens the first reading of the project of the Law on the State Budget. After 
approval of the Budget Committee’s report, the Cabinet of Ministers has two weeks to 
implement the amendments and recommendations of the Rada in its project of the budget 
and submit it to the parliament for the second reading.  
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The second reading begins with the report of the Minister of Finance. If the 
Cabinet’s proposal has a budget deficit, the ceiling of the budget deficit shall be approved 
first. Next, the Rada approves the project of the budget clause-by-clause. If the clause-by-
clause voting does not effect essential changes to the amount of the budget deficit or the 
deputies agreed to reduce spending proportionately,99 the Cabinet may propose and the 
Rada may agree to vote for the budget in whole. Otherwise, the project of the budget is 
handed over to the Budget Committee for revision. Standing committees and deputies 
have three days to submit their amendments to the Budget Committee which then has five 
days to consider amendments and provide deputies with its conclusions no later than 
three days before the start of the third reading. 
         
The third reading begins with a report of the Chairman of the Budget Committee 
and co-report of the Minister of Finance. If the deputies agree on the proposed 
amendments to the budget, the Verkhovna Rada votes for the budget in whole. If not, the 
budget expenses are reduced proportionately.  
 
If the Law on the State Budget is not passed by 2 December of the current year, 
the parliament passes a resolution on financing of urgent expenses until approval of the 
Law on the State Budget. 
 
As noted above, the Budget Committee is a key structure responsible for all 
aspects of the budget cycle within the Verkhovna Rada, including those pertaining to the 
defense budget. The National Security and Defense Committee (NSDCOM) is the 
committee which deals specifically with issues regarding defense. The NSDCOM 
considers draft legislation, prepares preliminary overviews of issues pertaining to 
national security and defense, participates in reviewing and adopting the State Budget 
                                                 
99 In this case, all articles of the budget are subject to the same percentage reduction except so called 
“protected” budget articles. A list of protected articles is approved by the Verkhovna Rada and included in 
the Law on the State Budget.  
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and controls the use of the State Budget funds for defense. Control over execution of the 
defense budget is an important aspect of parliamentary participation in the budgeting for 
defense and will be discussed in the next section. 
4. The Presidency and the Defense Budget 
Once it has been approved by the parliament, the Law on the State Budget of 
Ukraine is signed by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and immediately forwarded to 
the President of Ukraine. The President has fifteen days to sign it or refer the budget to 
the parliament for a second consideration.  
 
If the president does not sign the budget during those fifteen days, it is considered 
approved by the president and must be signed and officially released. 
 
If after a second consideration the Verkhovna Rada votes for the budget by no 
less than two thirds of its constitutional composition, the president is obligated to sign the 
Law on the State Budget and officially release it within ten days.100 
 
To coordinate activities in the defense realm the President of Ukraine utilizes the 
National Security and Defense Council (NSDC). Originally established in 1992 by a 
presidential decree as the National Security Council,101 this government body was finally 
secured in the Constitution and by the Law on the National Security and Defense 
Council, adopted in 1998. Pursuant to the Constitution,  
 
                                                 
100 The Constitution of Ukraine. Article 94. Internet. Online. Available http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96-%E2%F0#Find  (16 April 2006).  
101 A presidential decree established the National Security Council (NSC) in 1992, as an advisory 
body attached to the President. In reality, the NSC not only influenced many Presidential decisions, but also 
indirectly aligned the activity of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, as well as military and security 
organizations. The NSC changed its status in 1994, when the President, by decree, legalized this situation 
granting the council the organizational and coordinative functions (Oleksiy Syvak. The Role of the 
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine in Political Decision-Making Process. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 2003, pp. 26-27). See also Chapter 2.  
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The NSDC is the coordinating body to the President of Ukraine on issues 
of national security and defense. The National Security and Defense 
Council of Ukraine coordinates and controls the activity of bodies of 
executive power in the sphere of national security and defense. The 
President of Ukraine is the Chairman of the National Security and Defense 
Council of Ukraine. The President of Ukraine forms the personal 
composition of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. 
The Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, the 
Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Minister of Internal Affairs 
of Ukraine and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, are ex officio 
members of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. The 
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine may take part in the 
meetings of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. 
Decisions of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine are put 
into effect by the decrees of the President of Ukraine.102 
On the defense budget side, The Law on the National Security and Defense 
Council of Ukraine stipulates that the NSDC develops and considers decisions regarding 
national security and defense, including proposals on the project of the Law of Ukraine 
on the State Budget of Ukraine. Also, the NSDC has the authority to carry out day-to-day 
control of executive organizations; it uses state officials and analysts of all government 
departments and utilizes research institutions and organizations of both private and public 
form of property to analyze necessary information;103 and initiates development of 
regulations and documents on national-security-and-defense-related issues and controls 
their implementation. Chairmen of the parliamentary committees, other deputies and high 
officials and other persons who are not members of the NSDC may take part in its 
meetings with a formal invitation from the Head of the National Security and Defense 
Council. 
D. CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTION OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
The Constitution gave the parliament broad authority over the security sector; 
however, due to many deficiencies which persisted in defense legislation, the Rada was 
                                                 
102 The functions and composition of the NSDC are defined in Article 107 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine. This translation was taken from: Oleksiy Syvak. The Role of the National Security and Defense 
Council of Ukraine in Political Decision-Making Process. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 
2003, p. 27.  
103 Oleksiy Syvak. The Role of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine in Political 
Decision-Making Process. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 2003, p. 28. 
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not extensively involved in the development of the Armed Forces. This section will focus 
on some aspects of parliamentary participation in the defense processes related to the 
control over the execution of the defense budget. It will assess how the parliament is 
exercising its rights to oversee the execution of the defense budget and analyze its 
effectiveness as a tool to ensure efficient utilization of budget resources. The situation 
discussed in this section was shaped by the introduction of the Constitution in 1996. 
Some efforts made to improve it in 2004 will be discussed in the next chapter.      
 
The parliament exercises its supervisory powers through the Accounting 
Chamber, which controls the use of funds of the State Budget, and through standing 
committees of the Verkhovna Rada. To deal with certain urgent issues, the Verkhovna 
Rada may establish temporary investigative and ad hoc (special) commissions.  
 
Provided by a broad constitutional mandate, parliamentary control might be an 
important tool to ensure proper and efficient use of the state resources in the defense 
sector. However, the real power of the Rada for the allocation and spending of the 
defense budget funds is rather limited and significantly less than that of the President.104 
 
In the case of adoption of legislative acts and the defense budget, the real role of 
the parliament is conditioned by the interests of the Government and the President who 
can veto parliamentary initiatives. To overcome a veto by the President, a constitutional 
majority of 300 votes is required.  In case of approval of state programs for the reform or 
development of security structures-an aspect which has direct budgetary implications-the 
parliament has neither real powers nor any real independent capacity. Ukraine’s 
constitution does not require the State Program for Reform and Development of the 
Armed Forces and similar programs to be discussed and approved by the parliament, 
                                                 
104 Leonid Polyakov, An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and Governance of the 
Defense and Security Sector in Ukraine, Geneva, January 2005, p.26. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/152.pdf  (28 March 2006). 
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leaving the right of approval solely to the President. However, if such programs contain 
changes to be made to the numerical strength or structure of the Armed Forces, they must 
be approved by the parliament in accordance with the Constitution. Providing strong 
presidential influence over the Verkhovna Rada, the latter usually (but not always) 
approves the new parameters. However, because the parliament is not involved in the 
development of the defense programs, it has few incentives to be involved in their 
implementation, including the funding process. As a result, none of the defense reform 
programs proposed by the executive branch received sufficient legislative support and 
proper funding to be fully implemented.105  
 
Another constrain on the Rada’s ability to control execution of the defense budget 
is the structure of the document itself. Despite the improvements made since 1992, it is 
still limited to a one year term and does not provide detailed clarification of all 
expenditures, which complicates oversight and requires considerable expertise on the part 
of members of the parliament. Although funding has been a major issue of defense 
development in Ukraine, neither the Budget Committee nor the NSDCOM has a 
subcommittee to deal specifically with the defense budget.  Currently the NSDCOM has 
a secretariat which includes thirty experts but it is not clear how many of them specialize 
in the budgeting sphere.106 The excessive secrecy which surrounds the defense sector 
aggravates the problem of providing budgeting oversight. The status of a people’s deputy 
allows access to any MOD data; however, the complicated procedure involved makes 
deputies unwilling to utilize this access.107 These security considerations also make the 
structure of defense spending unavailable to the media and the general public, 
minimizing the possibility that they could then bring issues to the attention of the 
parliamentarians. 
                                                 
105 Leonid Polyakov, An Analytical Overview of Democratic Oversight and Governance of the 
Defense and Security Sector in Ukraine, Geneva, January 2005, p.27. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Working_Papers/152.pdf  (28 March 2006). 
106 Ibid., p. 26. 
107 David Bertz.  Comparing Frameworks of Parliamentary Oversight: Poland, Hungary, Russia, 
Ukraine, Geneva, July, 2003, p.13. Internet. Online. Available   
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/bed04/bed04.pdf  (28 March 2006). 
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On the MOD side, there are no legal provisions which require it to report to the 
Verkhovna Rada on its resource management activities, apart from the annual 
government budget report. The MOD reports on the implementation of the State Budget 
quarterly and annually to the Accounting Chamber, which, in turn, reports to the 
parliament. However, the Accounting Chamber itself does not pay much attention to the 
financial business of the Armed Forces. A review of the Accounting Chamber’s activities 
revealed that during the period from 1998 to 2004, it initiated only a few inspections of 
the MOD’s financial structures and activities.108 
 
Also, the Ukrainian parliament has a right to question witnesses from the military 
as part of the budget approval process and to oversee its execution through a 
parliamentary committee.109 Unfortunately, the author of this thesis was not able to find 
publicly available evidence that this right has been utilized by the Rada. 
 
Despite powerful constitutional provisions, sustained and detailed budgetary 
scrutiny of the defense sector by the Ukrainian parliament does not occur. Several factors 
account for this. Among them are lack of precision within the legislation governing the 
participants in the defense budget process, lack of expertise and support available to the 
parliament to effectively deal with defense budget issues, the broad structure of the 
defense budget, and the reluctance of the Rada to exercise powers which are already at its 
disposal. 
E. CONCLUSIONS  
Even taking into account that budgeting for defense, as well as many other 
defense aspects in Ukraine, was developed literally from scratch and that this 
development took place in an unfavorable political and economic environment, the 
                                                 
108 For more information see http://www.ac-
rada.gov.ua/achamber/control/uk/publish/article?showHidden=1&art_id=47327&cat_id=34761&ctime=11
00703499452  (28 March 2006). 
109 Defense Economics: Reform, Restructuring, Realignment. A report of the George C. Marshall 
European Center for Security Studies Conference, March, 2000, p. 18. Internet. Online. Available  
http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/sma01/sma01.pdf  (28 March 2006).  
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progress made in the defense budgeting field over the years from 1991 to 2004 may be 
considered low. Ten years from the crude defense budget of 1992 to the program 
oriented, but still rough budget of 2002, is a too long of a period during which the 
country lost many opportunities to improve efficiency of the armed forces by 
consolidating defense and budget policies. 
 
Defense budgets during this period did not reflect the reform and reorganization 
processes which desperately needed purposeful funding. By providing detailed and 
reform oriented budgets, the Verkhovna Rada might have assumed a credible position to 
control implementation of military reform; however, it preferred not to be involved in the 
management of defense resources. Neither did the parliament develop a capacity to 
monitor execution of the defense budgets proposed by the government. 
  
The capabilities developed by the executive branch (e.g., the NSDC framework) 
basically excluded participation of the legislative branch and therefore could not fully 
utilize their potential. The MOD itself did not adopt an efficient budgeting system, which 
might be explained by a desire to have greater flexibility over use of the budget funds. 
However, in reality it led to inefficiency and corruption.110 The next chapter will cover 
developments in the defense realm during the period 2004-2006 and examine how they 




                                                 
110 The problem of corruption within the Ukrainian MOD is beyond the scope of this study. For an 
overview of the situation with respect to corruption and inefficient use of resources by the MOD of Ukraine 
which occurred through 2004, see Anatoliy Grytsenko. Interview. Mj Neochikuvalj Takjkh Mashtabiv 
Porushen’ i Bezvidpovidalnosti Kerivnikov Vjstchoi Lanki. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Internet. 
Online. Available   http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=ua&part=news&sub=read&id=4948 (17 April 
2006).    
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IV. 2004 - 2006: THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE BULLETIN AND 
THE LAW ON ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE 
PLANNING 
Our experience reveals that rational defense resource management is a 
fundamental precondition for implementation of any reforms. And that 
realistic approach and achievability of plans are necessary prerequisites 
for the development of an army of a new type, which is able to carry out 
joint missions shoulder-to-shoulder with our partners to provide peace and 
security for the European nations.  
Evgen K. Marchuk111 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of 2004 the only tangible results of the Ukrainian defense reform were 
a significant reduction of the number of military personnel and a change of the structure 
of the Armed Forces. In June 2004 the Air Defense Troops were merged with the Air 
Force. After that the AFU consisted of the General Staff, Land Forces, Air Forces, Naval 
Forces, and units of central subordination, e.g. training units and military institutions. By 
functional purposes, the AFU are structured into the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF), 
Main Defense Forces, and Reinforcement Forces. At the beginning of 2004, the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces had 355,000 personnel, including 265,500 military servicemen 
and 89,500 civilians.112    
 
Military reform failed to provide significant improvement of combat capabilities, 
which remained rather low. Defense structures remained oversized, especially in terms of 
command and control, support elements, and resource consumption.113 Huge piles of 
ammunition stored on Ukrainian territory were waiting for decommission and remained a 
                                                 
111 The Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for the Period through 2015. Foreword by the Minister 
of Defense. Internet. Online. Available http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=def_planning&lang=ua  (25 
April 2006).  
112 Ibid., p.25 
113 Andrii Smorodin. Euro-Atlantic Integration-Ukrainian Security Options in the Twenty-First 
Century: Origins and Developments. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 2005, p. 56. Internet. 
Online. Available http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Mar%5FSmorodin.pdf  (27 April 2006).  
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constant source of danger. Due to limited resource allocation, the main emphasis in 
combat training was on the units assigned to the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. However, 
even these forces could not maintain a proper level of professionalism. 114 
 
Large portions of military equipment became obsolete and literally all machinery 
and facilities which still remained operational required considerable investments in 
maintenance and repair. The MOD Expert Commission, which in accordance with a 
presidential decree conducted a defense review in Ukraine from April 2003 until June 
2004, concluded that as of 2004, the Armed Forces of Ukraine could not fully carry out 
their tasks due to chronic underfunding.115 The Commission recommended a 
fundamental shift in military reform aimed, inter alia, towards enhancement of planning 
practices within the MOD. Official results of the defense review were presented in the 
Strategic Defense Bulletin (SDB) issued by the Ukrainian government. The government 
acknowledged an urgent need to fix this situation in the defense sphere. It also stressed 
the vitality of the processes of appropriation and allocation of funds for Ukrainian 
national security. 
 
The aspirations of Ukraine to joint NATO, declared by President Kuchma in 
2002, were among the major factors which triggered this shift in attitude towards defense. 
In the course of increased co-operation with the Alliance, the issue of conformity of 
Ukrainian military structures and processes with NATO standards became especially 
relevant.  
 
                                                 
114 A series of military catastrophes, which took place in Ukraine during the period from 2000 to 
2004, tragically emphasized the disastrous situation in the Armed Forces. They included explosions of 
ammunition dumps and fatal mistakes during military exercises. For more information see: Askold 
Krushelnycky. Ukraine: Depot Blast Latest in Series of Tragic Blunders by Army. Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 May, 2004. Internet. Online. Available  
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/5/FFA81476-77DA-41D2-8DD1-2B8C3ABFFA9C.html  (27 
April 2006).  
115 The Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for the Period through 2015, p. 32. Internet. Online. 
Available http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=def_planning&lang=ua  (25 April 2006). 
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Chapter IV will cover development of the NATO-Ukraine relations as well as 
recent developments in the defense realm during the period 2004 to 2006 and examine 
how they have affected budgeting for defense in Ukraine. This chapter consists of three 
main sections. The first section will discuss development of NATO-Ukraine co-operation 
in regard to defense resource management in Ukraine. The second section will include 
descriptions of budgetary implications of the Strategic Defense Bulletin and in the new 
Law on the Organization of Defense Planning. It will describe future plans for defense 
reform in Ukraine and discuss how they are supported by financial considerations. 
Finally, the third section will provide an overview of the 2005 and 2006 defense budgets. 
B. IMPACT OF CO-OPERATION WITH NATO  
Since Ukraine was established as an independent country, the West attached 
particular attention to developments within the new state. This special interest was caused 
by several factors, the most important of which were the large size and strategic 
geographical location of the country, and its possession of nuclear weapons. The 
constructive position of the new Ukrainian government during international talks on the 
issue of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and its commitment to establish democracy 
helped to integrate Ukraine into major frameworks for international co-operation in the 
security sphere, including the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Partnership for Peace 
Program (PFP). Ukraine also signed a partnership agreement with the European Union 
(EU) in 1994, being the first CIS country to sign such a document. In 1995 Ukraine was 
admitted to the Council of Europe.116 However, the strict criteria and inflexible approach 
which these organizations exert on their partners resulted in a modest level of co-
operation between Ukraine and European structures, as Ukraine could not satisfy their 
requirements due to its political and economic weaknesses. Although membership in the 
EU remains a foreign policy priority for Ukraine, a relationship with NATO appears to be 
the best way to construct links with Europe.117 
 
                                                 
116 Andrii Smorodin. Euro-Atlantic Integration-Ukrainian Security Options in the Twenty-First 
Century: Origins and Developments. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 2005, p. 14. Internet. 
Online. Available http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Mar%5FSmorodin.pdf  (27 April 2006).  
117 Jennifer Medcalf. NATO: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford, 2005, p. 158. 
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1. The Partnership for Peace  
The PFP was designed as a program for practical bilateral co-operation between 
individual partner countries and NATO. This initiative was aimed towards bringing 
countries of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union closer to the Western democratic 
institutions trough co-operation in the defense and security sector.  It allows each partner 
country to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own 
priorities.118 
   
The PFP provides partner countries with a number of benefits in terms of expert 
and technical assistance performed by NATO according to each country’s specific 
interests and needs. Co-operation encompasses a wide range of defense-related issues, 
focusing on defense reform and managing the consequences of defense reform, but 
touches on virtually every field of NATO activity, including defense policy and planning, 
civil-military relations, education and training, air defense, communications and 
information systems, crisis management, and civil emergency planning. Through the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO and Partner countries engage in regular 
consultations on all aspects of their collaboration. Issues of defense reform, budgeting 
and planning are among those which require extensive technical exchanges to achieve 
practical results.119  
   
The relationship between Ukraine and NATO commenced immediately upon 
achieving independence in 1991 when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Co-operation Council). A few years later, in 
1994, Ukraine became the first of the CIS countries to join the PFP. By signing the PFP 
Framework Document, Ukraine, inter alia, committed to the facilitation of transparency 
in its national defense planning and budgeting processes. 
                                                 
118 NATO Topics. Partnership for Peace. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html  (29 April 2006). 
119 NATO Topics. NATO’s Co-operation with Partners: What Does It Mean in Practice? Internet. 
Online. Available http://www.nato.int/issues/cooperation_partners/index.html  (29 April 2006). 
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During the 1990s, Ukraine participated in hundreds of activities carried out under 
the PFP program. Those included training and military exercises conducted abroad as 
well as in the Ukrainian territory, participation in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, 
and other activities such as conferences and international exchanges. The Ukrainian 
Armed Forces were able to gain a lot of experience at the operational and tactical levels 
in terms of familiarizing Ukrainian military specialists with NATO standards and 
procedures, and improving cross-cultural understanding.   
 
However, on the Ukrainian side, it did not result in building effective military co-
operation structures and procedures. The main reason for the lack of a positive outcome 
was the continuous instability inside the Ukrainian military, precipitated by the failure of 
the country’s leadership to provide clear political guidance, as well as by persistent 
reorganizations and budget reductions. During this period, Ukrainian strategic level 
documents were too unspecific to provide clear guidance for defense planners on policy 
priorities and allocation of resources.120 Consequently, they could not identify areas of 
interest in this sphere which might be addressed by NATO experts to improve Ukrainian 
practices. Moreover, middle and top level Ukrainian military leaders often perceived 
international military co-operation as a means to conduct combat training at the expense 
of the Western partners, disregarding the actual purposes of their initiatives.121 This 
attitude minimized absorption of NATO planning methods and budgeting practices since 
the Ukrainian military was less involved in managing financial and other resources for 
co-operation that for consuming them at the final stage.  
 
In sum, Ukraine was an active PFP participant from the earliest stage of this 
initiative; however, planning and budgeting was not on the list of Ukraine’s priorities for 
                                                 
120 Leonid Polyakov. U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability. Strategic 
Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, pp.22-23. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?PubID=590  (29 April 2006). See also 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
121 Ibid., pp.30-31. 
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co-operation under the PFP at that time. This is shown by the analysis of the development 
of defense budgeting in Ukraine during 1990s, which reveals that the changes that 
occurred at the governmental level were determined by other causes (See Chapter III). 
The limited public availability of information on budgeting within the Ukrainian MOD 
also demonstrates that the objective of facilitating transparency in national defense 
planning and budgeting processes was not completely fulfilled. Nevertheless, the PFP 
became Ukraine’s main path to advance expertise in the defense sector and to work with 
the West. It helped to identify areas of the NATO-Ukraine co-operation which required 
specific attention and implementation of these findings into other co-operation 
mechanisms as the partnership was progressing.  
2. The Charter on Distinctive Partnership 
By 1997 Ukrainian political leadership recognized many advantages of a Western 
orientation in foreign policy. The Ukrainian contribution to international security was 
also acknowledged by NATO. On 9 July 1997, at the Madrid Summit, NATO and 
Ukraine signed the Charter on Distinctive Partnership. The Charter asserted the 
importance of an independent, stable and democratic Ukraine to European stability, 
recognized the “solid progress… across a broad range of activities” between NATO and 
Ukraine, and aimed to “promote further stability and democratic values in Central and 
Eastern Europe.”122 The Charter did not offer membership or extend Article 5 protection 
to Ukraine, but it assured Ukraine an increased consultative voice through the NATO-
Ukraine Commission (NUC), and set out principals and arrangements for the further 
development of NATO-Ukraine relations, identifying areas for consultation and co-
operation.123  
 
                                                 
122 NATO. Charter on Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Ukraine, Madrid, 9 July, 1997. Internet. Online. Available  http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm  
(1 May 2006).  
123 Clarke Cramer. The Great Orange Hope: Ukraine, NATO, and the Dilemma of European 
Integration after the Orange Revolution. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, December 2005, p.28. 
Internet. Online. Available  http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Dec%5FCramer.pdf  (2 May 
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A broad range of topics for co-operation were covered in the Charter, including 
the following: 
• Civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, and 
Ukrainian defense reform; 
• Defense planning, budgeting, policy, strategy, and national security 
concepts. 
The Charter established joint seminars and joint working groups as the primary 
mechanisms for consultations in the identified areas. 
 
The NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform (JWGDR) was 
organized in 1998, under the auspices of the NUC. It is the primary focus for NATO-
Ukraine co-operation in defense and security sector reform.  The JWGDR serves as a tool 
through which the Allies can provide assistance. It also provides the institutional basis for 
co-operation with ministries and agencies involved in supporting defense and security 
sector reform in Ukraine. These include the NSDC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOD, 
Verkhovna Rada and others.124   
 
All NATO member states and Ukraine are represented at meetings of the 
JWGDR. The meetings are chaired by NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Defense 
Planning and Operations. The JWGDR meets quarterly at the expert level and annually at 
the Senior Level when high-ranking officials are involved. Once a year, the JWGDR 
organizes informal consultations where issues of defense and security reform are 
discussed at the level of Allied and Ukrainian Defense Ministers, with involvement of 
key defense and security experts.125  
 
 
                                                 
124 NATO Topics. NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. Internet. Online. 
Available http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/jwgdr.html  (3 May 2006).  
125 Ibid.  
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3. NATO-Ukraine Action Plan 
In May 2002, President Kuchma announced a decision made by the Ukrainian 
National Security and Defense Council, to seek eventual NATO membership for Ukraine. 
This step logically continued the progressive development and deepening of Ukraine’s 
co-operation with NATO.126 It ended the epoch of the “multi-vector” foreign policy 
which held little promise for Ukraine in the post-September 11th world.127 NATO’s 
positive response to the Ukrainian initiative led to the development of a NATO-Ukraine 
Action Plan-adopted at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Prague in November 
2002. 
 
The purpose of the Action Plan is “to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic 
objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-
Atlantic security structures and to provide a strategic framework for existing and future 
NATO-Ukraine cooperation.”128 The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan provides for Annual 
Target Plans (ATP) to be developed to support jointly agreed principles and objectives. 
Annual Target Plans consist of specific measures for Ukrainian and NATO-Ukraine joint 
actions. The attainment of the goals of the Action Plan and NATO-Ukraine Target Plans 
became the main priority in Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO.129 Soon after adoption 
of the Action Plan, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko said “We are well aware 
                                                 
126 Anatoly Zlenko. Interview. The National Security and Defense Magazine. Ukrainian Center for 
Economic and Political Studies, #7, 2003, p. 2. Internet. Online. Available  
http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/?cur_nomer=43  (8 May 2006). 
127 Clarke Cramer. The Great Orange Hope: Ukraine, NATO, and the Dilemma of European 
Integration after the Orange Revolution. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, December 2005, p. 33. 
Internet. Online. Available  http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Dec%5FCramer.pdf  (2 May 
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128 NATO. Prague Summit. NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, 22 November 2002. Internet. Online. 
Available http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm  (3 May 2006). 
129 Anatoly Zlenko. Interview. The National Security and Defense Magazine. Ukrainian Center for 
Economic and Political Studies, #7, 2003, p. 3. Internet. Online. Available  
http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/?cur_nomer=43  (8 May 2006). 
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that the results and degree of accomplishment of the planned events will be critical for 
NATO’s perception of Ukraine as a potential member of the Alliance.” 130  
 
The resource implications are addressed in Subsection C of Section II (Security, 
Defense and Military Issues) of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. It suggests 
implementation of resource management systems which follow NATO methodology and 
draw on international experience in defense budgets. The objectives for actions in 
resource area are as follows: 
II.C.1 Increase transparency in defense planning and budgeting 
procedures; transition to modern NATO defense programming, 
budgeting and financing principles; 
 
II.C.2 Reform financial planning and funding procedures in support of 
defense reform and the transformation of the Armed Forces into a 
professional force; 
 
II.C.3 Train personnel in resource management, budgeting and defense 
finance issues; 
 
II.C.4 Restructure production, procurement, financing and tendering 
processes in the Defense Industrial Complex, to reflect Ukraine’s 
Euro-Atlantic orientation and goal of becoming a fully functioning 
market economy. This will include adaptation to NATO standards 




                                                 
130 Anatoly Zlenko. Interview. The National Security and Defense Magazine. Ukrainian Center for 
Economic and Political Studies, #7, 2003, p. 3. Internet. Online. Available  
http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/?cur_nomer=43  (8 May 2006). 
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4. Annual Target Plans: 2003-2005 
a. 4.1 Content of the Annual Target Plans Regarding Resource 
Matters: 2003-2005  
The actions on resource matters drafted in the NATO-Ukraine Annual 
Target Plans encompassed a wide range of issues from development of transparent 
defense resource planning and budgeting procedures, to adoption of legislative acts 
supporting efficient and transparent defense planning. Special attention was given to 
educational and academic activities and consultations with NATO experts. Portions of 
activities of this sort have increased since the first 2003 ATP which focused more on the 
development of technical aspects of defense budgeting. This shift suggests that 
Ukrainians realized the importance of international experience and expertise available 
through NATO-Ukraine co-operation mechanisms.  The MOD of Ukraine, in 
collaboration with other governmental organizations, was responsible for the 
implementation of actions pertaining to the resource matters outlined in NATO-Ukraine 
Action Plans. 
b. 4.2 Implementation of the Annual Target Plans 
During the period from 2003 to 2005, the Ukrainian MOD performed a 
number of actions in order to fulfill objectives of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, 
including those on defense planning and budget matters. In 2003, MOD representatives 
participated in a NATO international symposium in Kyiv, titled “Economic Aspects of 
the Euro-Atlantic Integration”. The MOD also began preparations for training of the 
defense planning specialists in the National Defense Academy. It prepared and submitted 
to the Ministry of Finance proposals on the methodology of detailed calculations of the 
need for financing in order to insure performance of tasks of international co-operation 
with NATO states. Experimental operation of the Defense Resource Management Model 
(DRMM) was started in order to develop proposals on introducing a comparable system 
in Ukraine. The model was provided by the U.S.131 
                                                 
131 Report on the Implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2003 Regarding Actions 
Performed by the MOD of Ukraine. Prepared by the Directorate of Euro-Atlantic Integration of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  
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Besides these actions, the Law on Democratic Civilian Control over 
Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State was adopted by the 
parliament in June 2003. Adoption of this law contributed to the fulfillment of the 
Ukrainian commitment to strengthen democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces 
made in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.132 It specified and widened authorities of the 
Verkhovna Rada regarding defense. On the budgeting side, it required the Rada to 
provide detailed specification of defense spending in the state budget. Therefore, the 
parliament now is obligated to request such a specification from the Cabinet.  This law 
stipulates that the Rada should consider execution of the defense budget when it conducts 
hearings on execution of the state budget.  It also provided parliamentarians with a right 
to consider and approve State programs on reform and development of the Armed Forces. 
   
In 2004 the Law on Organization of the Defense Planning was elaborated 
and passed by the Verkhovna Rada on 18 October. An information-analytical system 
called “Resource” was developed and began functioning. This system provides the MOD 
with comprehensive estimates of maintenance costs throughout the Armed Forces. The 
National Defense Academy completed preparations for training of specialists in defense 
planning and conducted an educational course on defense planning in June 2004 with the 
support of the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; one representative of the 
General Staff completed seven days of training in Germany in May 2004.133 
 
During 2005, the MOD specialists participated in two international 
conferences on defense planning which took place in Kyiv. Seminars and consultations 
with NATO and NATO Member States on planning and budgeting issues were conducted 
on a regular basis. The “Resource” system was upgraded to operate in accordance with 
NATO standards and procedures. One Ukrainian officer enrolled in an internship 
                                                 
132 Objective I.1.A.7 
133 Report on the Implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2004 Regarding Actions 
Performed by the MOD of Ukraine. Prepared by the Directorate of Euro-Atlantic Integration of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
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program at the NATO Department of Defense Policy and Planning. Twenty four 
Ukrainian officers enrolled in internship programs provided by Poland to study the Polish 
experience of integration to NATO.134 
5. The Law on Organization of the Defense Planning  
The Law on Organization of the Defense Planning is intended to regulate decision 
making in the defense realm involving different participants in the process and, in effect, 
is the first step undertaken by the Ukrainian government towards creation of a cohesive 
defense planning and budgeting system. This law defined defense planning as a 
component of the state strategic planning and resource operating system.  It established 
three categories of defense planning: 
• Long-Term Planning (12 year plans); 
• Medium-Term Planning (6 year plans); 
• Short-Term Planning (2 year plans). 
The Law on Organization of the Defense Planning is aimed towards increasing 
transparency in defense planning and budget processes and adoption of modern systems 
for development defense programs and budgets in accordance with practices existing in 
NATO countries. It defines general principles of defense planning and responsibilities of 
governmental bodies within this process. However, the provisions of this law are not 
sufficient to establish a comprehensive defense planning system for Ukraine. That 
requires development of certain procedures within each governmental entity which 
participates in defense planning. A discussion which emerged in the Armed Forces after 
adoption of the Law on Organization of the Defense Planning is focused on finding a 
rational way of planning within the military control and command structures and 
incorporation of commands of all levels into the defense planning system. One of the 
major issues involved is the allocation of responsibilities between the MOD and the 
General Staff.135 
                                                 
134 Report on the Implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2005 Regarding Actions 
Performed by the MOD of Ukraine. Prepared by the Directorate of Euro-Atlantic Integration of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 
135 M. Denezkin. Proposals on Improvement of the Defense Planning System. Central Research 
Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 9 March, 2005, p.1. 
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To summarize, the Ukrainian MOD introduced a number of measures in order to 
fulfill the objectives of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan regarding resource matters. The 
most notable progress took place in educational activities and exchanges at the expert 
level. Full implementation of the actions outlined in the ATPs was difficult due to 
insufficient funding and the long process of approval of the ATPs by the Ukrainian 
government. For example, the 2005 ATP was signed by the President on 21 April 2005, 
but only 49 percent of the funds appropriated for its implementation were received, most 
of the them at the end of the fiscal year, making implementation difficult.136 
Nevertheless, the Law on Organization of the Defense Planning introduced a basis for a 
system of defense planning for Ukraine. Now more specific regulations must be 
elaborated in order to synchronize all aspects of the defense planning, including 
budgeting.137 
  
However, the 2004 defense budget was not much different from the 2003 defense 
budget, as it was demonstrated in Chapter III. Moreover, the 2004 budget provided for 
funds to continue building the missile cruiser “Ukraine”, a war ship which Ukraine 
received unfinished when the Black Sea Fleet was divided. It was unsuitable for 
Ukraine’s military doctrine and, if commissioned, would generate excessive costs.138  
 
The 2005 budget was not much different from 2003. It contained 32 items (by 
contrast U.S. defense budget contains 3000-4000 detailed items) and, consequently was 
also far from the common NATO budget practices. 
   
                                                 
136 Report by the Directorate of Euro-Atlantic Integration of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine. 
137 A draft of the Guidance on Organization and Financing of Strategic Planning, Including Defense 
Planning was prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in 2005. The MOD has the Temporary 
Guidance on Organization and Conducting of Defense Planning in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.      
138 Anatoliy Grytsenko. Interview. Umovnostei v Boiovii Pidgotovtsi ne Bude. The Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine. Internet. Online. Available. 
http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=ua&part=appearance&sub=read&id=7003  (7 May 2006).  
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NATO influence has encouraged the work towards establishing responsible 
budgeting within the Ukrainian MOD. However, the process is still very new and 
requires co-operation and support from the executive as well as from the legislative 
branch of government. An overview of the situation with respect to the 2006 defense 
budget will provide some background in this regard later in this chapter. The next section 
will describe future plans for development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as outlined in 
the Strategic Defense Bulletin and discuss their budgetary components.   
C. CHANGES TO THE DEFENSE STRUCTURE TO BE IMPLEMENTED 
BY 2015 
Ukrainian experiences in defense reform, changes which occurred in the 
Ukrainian political system, new foreign and national security policy priorities of Ukraine, 
and certain dynamics of the world security environment all suggest that the armed forces 
of  NATO countries are the most suitable model for the future development of the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine. Implementation of such a model will provide Ukraine with armed 
forces which will correspond to Western security requirements, will be well equipped and 
trained, able to protect the country and contribute to peace and stability in the European 
region.139 The experience gained by NATO member states in defense reform and 
restructuring of armed forces may assist Ukraine in achieving these objectives.  
 
In 2003, the President of Ukraine made the decision to conduct a defense review 
in Ukraine to elaborate a model and define priorities for the future development of the 
Armed Forces. This initiative was undertaken based upon an analysis of practices 
recently used by the most advanced European countries and the U.S.140  The Strategic 
Defense Bulletin, published by the Ukrainian government in 2004, contains the results of 
the defense review and recommendations based on these findings. It is a basic document 
to be used to draft more detailed programs for reform and development of the Armed 
                                                 
139 Ukraine: Strategic Priorities. Defense Reform in Ukraine. The National Institute of Strategic 
Studies. Internet. Online. Available http://www.niss.gov.ua/book/2004_html/005.htm  (8 May 2006).  
140 V. Leonov. The Defense Doctrine of Ukraine and the White Book of Ukraine: Programs for 
Reform of the Armed Forces. National Institute of International Security. Internet. Online. Available 
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Forces. The SDB delineates tasks for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their 
organizational structure as it should be in 2015. It also provides financial estimates of 
costs for reform and defines how they should be allocated from 2004 to 2015. 
 
According to the Strategic Defense Bulletin, in 2015 Ukraine will have a new 
type of armed forces.141 They will be flexible, highly mobile and able to react to any 
emergency. An improved structure, a sufficient level of defense capabilities and total 
strength between 90,000-100,000 personnel (70,000-75,000 military and 20,000-25,000 
civilian) will provide the capability to deal with low- and medium-intensity conflicts. 
Moreover, they will be able to effectively participate in international operations, provide 
assistance to civilian authorities and maintain sufficient mobilization capacity to respond 
in case of a high-intensity conflict. 
  
The Armed Forces of Ukraine will continue to be divided in organizational and 
functional components. Organizationally, the AFU will consist of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Land Forces, the Air Forces, the Naval Forces, as well as 
military units and organizations of central subordination. Functionally, the AFU will be 
divided in the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces and Reinforcement 
Forces.  
 
The JRRF will be the most capable and well equipped component of the Armed 
Forces, manned at 90-100 percent of their designed strength. Their operational readiness 
timeline will be less than 30 days. Main Defense Forces will be the most numerous 
functional component of the AFU, with operational readiness within 90 and 120 days. 
They will constitute the basis of the state defense. Their manning will be at 60 to 70 
 
                                                 
141 The following part of this section was developed based on the review and analysis of the Ukraine’s 
Strategic Defense Bulletin until 2015 provided by the National Security and Defense Magazine published 
by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, #8, 2004, pp. 8-12. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/?cur_nomer=56  (8 May 2006). 
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percent of their designed strength. Reinforcement Forces will consist of units that are 
mobilization capable and will be able to reach operational readiness within 120 and 180 
days.   
  
A significant amount of equipment and armaments will be removed from the 
military’s inventory. Extensive infrastructure will be reduced and an adequate ratio 
between combat and support units will be achieved. Procurement of armaments and 
military equipment of domestic and foreign origin, as well as modernization, are planned 
to meet the challenges of modern warfare. Significant changes will be implemented in the 
logistical support system. It will be decentralized to increase cost-effectiveness and attain 
greater flexibility. The provision of certain types of support such as food supplies, 
housing, and non-military internal functions, to a great extent, will shift to civilian 
contractors. The number of existing logistical bases and other units of logistical support 
will be considerably reduced. 
 
Implementation of the 2015 Armed Forces model is attainable only on the 
condition of adequate financial and resource support for this process. The Ukrainian 
government estimated the costs of defense reform and development at UAH 124.794 
billion through 2015. This number takes into account future forecasts of all major 
economic variables significant for this process. Expert and technical facilities developed 
within the Ukrainian MOD, including the Resource information-analytical system, were 
employed to generate these estimates.142  
 
The SDB provides MOD annual budget projections through 2015 (see Table 4.1) 
as well as distribution of costs for procurement and modernization of equipment and 
armaments, and construction of infrastructure among branches of the AFU (see Figure 
                                                 
142 The Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine for the Period through 2015. Financial and Economic 
Grounds of Reform and Development of the 2015 Model of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, p. 83. Internet. 
Online. Available http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=def_planning&lang=ua  (25 April 2006). 
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4.1). Shares of transitional period programs in total projected funding (see Figure 4.2) 
and other estimates are also included. 
 
Table 4.1  MOD Budget Projections through 2015, UAH millions143 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
4137.4 6077.5 7140 7824 8722 9764 10708 11678 12660 13786 15064 16446 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of Costs for Procurement and Modernization of Equipment 
and Armaments and Construction of Infrastructure among Branches of 
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Figure 4.2 Financing of the Transitional Period Programs, Percent of Total 
 
As is demonstrated by Table 4.1, Ukrainian defense expenditures are expected to 
reach UAH 16.4 billion in 2015 or four times more than provided in 2004. Calculated as 
defense budget expenditures per serviceman (almost UAH 170,000 or over $30,000), this 
will bring Ukraine close to Poland and some other East European states that joined 
NATO. 
 
The authors of the SDB concluded that the planned funding of the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine will ensure their reform and development and the achievement of the model 
planned for 2015. Their assessments were based on a comprehensive analysis of major 
economic indices which demonstrated positive trends and suggested that future Ukrainian 
economic potential would be strong enough to ensure the planned level of financing.   At 
the same time, they concluded that reducing defense expenditure even by 0.1-0.3 percent 
can result in non-implementation of the plans for reform and development of the Armed 
Forces by changing the implementation terms of the major programs such as defense 
research and development programs, procurement, housing construction, training, etc. 
Taking this into account, consistent support to the Armed Forces in terms of financing 
within estimated limits will be the main task of the state.  It will be subject to the 
influence of the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, the 
Accounting Chamber of Ukraine and other state organizations having responsibilities for 
the defense sphere. 
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Estimates shown in the Strategic Defense Bulletin reveal an optimistic scenario 
for Ukrainian economic development and the financing of the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, 
defense budgets for 2005 and 2006 demonstrate a gap between planned and actual levels 
of funding for some important defense budget items. The next section will provide an 
overview of the 2005 and 2006 defense budgets and discuss some related budget issues. 
D. DEFENSE BUDGETS 2005 AND 2006 
By the end of 2004 Ukraine had developed an impressive record of NATO 
participation. Ukraine’s military co-operation efforts established an encouraging climate 
for future integration. However, political shortcomings were the main obstacle on the 
way towards desired NATO membership.145  The peaceful 2004 Orange Revolution and 
ensuing democratic election of Victor Yushchenko reinforced Ukrainian prospects to join 
the Alliance. A new administration clearly delineated the national security priorities of 
Ukraine and declared NATO membership the end goal of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  It genuinely committed to political reform aimed to meet NATO democratic 
requirements. Allies welcomed these promising initiatives at a meeting of foreign 
ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania on 21 April 2005 when NATO and Ukraine launched an 
Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s aspirations to NATO membership.  
 
On 27 June 2005, during the NATO Secretary General‘s visit to Kyiv, the 
Ukrainian government formally presented an initial discussion paper. This document 
addressed key issues outlined in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement and 1997 
Membership Action Plan Document, addressing domestic and foreign policy, defense and 
security sector reform, as well as legal and security issues. A package of short-term 
actions was also launched in Vilnius, designed to improve NATO-Ukraine co-operation 
in areas vital to success of the democratic transformation: strengthening democratic 
institutions, enhancing political dialogue, intensifying defense and security sector reform, 
                                                 
145 Clark Cramer. The Great Orange Hope: Ukraine, NATO, and the Dilemma of European 
Integration after the Orange Revolution. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, December 2005, p. 36. 
Internet. Online. Available  http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Dec%5FCramer.pdf  (2 May 
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improving public information, and managing the social and economic consequences of 
reform. These were highlighted as priorities for the new Ukrainian government.146 
 
However, that was an uneasy time for Ukraine. During the period 2005-2006, the 
country experienced several political scandals which, coupled with the poor economic 
performance of the new government, had a harmful impact on the image of the Orange 
Revolution and its supporters. The rush toward the 2006 parliamentary election shifted 
the NATO membership issue towards the sphere of political speculation. The Verkhovna 
Rada sent mixed signals to the Alliance when it refused to approve NATO-Ukraine 
initiatives on NATO utilization of Ukrainian strategic airlift capabilities and on 
admission of foreign troops in Ukrainian territory to participate in international military 
exercises. The President signed a decree on implementation of the 2006 NATO-Ukraine 
Target Plan only in April 2006, after the March parliamentary election. 
 
However, Ukraine did fulfill a number of commitments made in Vilnius. 
Particular progress was made in the realm of defense reform. Key leadership positions in 
the Ministry of Defense were filled by civilians. Plans for reduction of the Armed Forces 
were corrected by decreasing the rate of reduction and shifting to the elimination of 
arsenals and ammunition depots. Implementation of the plans for transition of the Armed 
Forces to manning on a contract basis was intensified. Significant changes were made to 
the structures of the MOD and the General Staff to increase efficiency of command and 
control and introduce a clear division of functions between the two. A new MOD 
leadership began to reform the procurement system in the Armed Forces.  Processes of 
combat preparation and training were also intensified.147 
 
                                                 
146 NATO Topics. NATO-Ukraine Relations. Intensified Dialogue. Internet. Online. Available 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/intensified_dialog.html  (11 May 2006). 
147 The White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine. Kyiv, 2006, pp. 17-20. Internet. Online. 
Available http://www.mil.gov.ua/ua/white_book/1.pdf  (19 March 2006). 
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The main factor which made these results possible was a satisfactory level of 
funding. Although fund allocations for defense in the 2005 budget were below the level 
set in the Strategic Defense Bulletin (UAH 5.9 billion compared to UAH 6.08 billion 
according to the SDB), the Armed Forces were able to implement a majority of the 
planned objectives since they received these funds in full and on timely basis. This 
happened for the first time since independence. Additionally, the MOD received UAH 
100 million from sales of excess military equipment and armaments, appropriated by the 
Verkhovna Rada for MOD needs (see Figure 2.1).148 This established a basis for further 
improvement of the situation in the defense sector and demonstrated that when stable 
funding is available (even though at a minimal level), good management can bring 
credible results. A new State Program of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
was elaborated by the Cabinet of Ministers, Verkhovna Rada, MOD and General Staff for 
the period from 2006 to 2011. This program took into account resource limitations and 
introduced a more efficient approach to resource planning within the AFU.  
 
However, the design of the 2006 defense budget endangered subsequent 
implementation of the plans for development of the Armed Forces.  According to the 
2006 Law on the State Budget of Ukraine, UAH 2 billion out of 8.9 billion appropriated 
to the MOD had to come from the sales of excess military equipment, armaments and 
property and from other sources such as sales of natural gas supplied to the National 
Stock Company “Naftogas of Ukraine” by the Russian Federation as payment for the 
military equipment transferred to Russia and revenues received from participation of 
Ukrainian troops in peacekeeping operations.149  Historical trends suggest that these 
funds were not likely to be received in full.150 Moreover, they had to be allocated to the 
                                                 
148 The White Book 2005: Defense Policy of Ukraine. Kyiv, 2006, p. 19. Internet. Online. Available 
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of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Internet. Online. Available  
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so called special fund, a budget account controlled by the Ministry of Finance and often 
used to cover shortcomings in the budget. According to the 2006 budget, programs of 
modernization and procurement of military equipment, reform of the Armed Forces, and 
international military co-operation should be financed from these funds. Furthermore, the 
schedule of financing was set up such that the MOD was expected to receive budget 
funds in the second half of the year, eliminating the possibility to use them as planned if 
official financial regulations are observed.151  
 
According to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Anatoly Grytsenko, such a situation 
became possible due to a lack of transparency in the decision-making process within the 
Cabinet of Ministers. In particular, he pointed out that the Ministry of Finance adjusts 
budget parameters without taking into account the recommendations of other ministries. 
The budget proposal is then presented to the parliament on behalf of the Cabinet. In the 
case of the 2006 defense budget, the Ministry of Finance ignored not only the opinion of 
the Minister of Defense but also a decision of the National Security and Defense Council 
which set parameters for the defense budget in December 2005. The Minister of Defense 
also admitted that there was little interest in the situation in the defense sector on the part 
of key officials in the government.152 
 
The Law on the State Budget of Ukraine for 2006 was approved by the parliament 
in December 2005. Although a majority of the deputies voted for the Cabinet’s proposal, 
the National Security and Defense Committee, in co-operation with the NSDC, undertook 
considerable efforts to defend the interests of the Armed Forces and the national security 
interests of Ukraine. As a result, in February 2006 the Verkhovna Rada amended the Law 
on the State Budget. The Ministry of Finance was obligated to direct funds assigned to 
                                                 
151 The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. News. Internet. Online. Available 
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the MOD immediately to its accounts.153 Nevertheless, this amendment did not guarantee 
the actual money would be received by the Armed Forces.  
 
The NSDCOM also supported the initiative of the Minister of Defense to provide 
the MOD with a credit which then would be paid by the revenues received from the sales 
of military equipment, MOD property, etc. However, as of March 2003 the status of this 
issue was left unresolved.   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
During the period from 2004 to 2006, an institutional base necessary for the 
creation and functioning of a defense resource management system has emerged in 
Ukraine. Adoption of the Law on Organization of the Defense Planning and completion 
of the Defense Review are among important arrangements pertaining to this process.  
Programs for the reform and development of the Armed Forces designed during this 
period were supported by financial considerations and forecasts. NATO-Ukraine co-
operation has gained effectiveness. NATO and Ukraine have jointly put together a list of 
specific activities (courses, seminars, expert exchanges, workshops). These provide 
valuable learning opportunities for the Ukrainian defense specialists and help to increase 
awareness about the significance of resource support for defense reform among 
Ukrainian officials. 
 
The beginning of an effort to enhance Ukrainian defense budgeting provides 
additional empirical data to evaluate the state of the NATO-Ukraine integrative process, 
as real defense budgets are objective and comparatively easy to quantify. In this regard, 
developments surrounding the 2006 defense budget revealed that bureaucratic inertia is 
still strong. It can and does thwart policy objectives, even those set at the presidential 
level. This suggests that defense reform issues should be introduced to more Ukrainian 
                                                 
153 Bila Kniga z Chornou Vidznakou. Interview of the Minister of Defense. The Ministry of Defense 
of Ukraine. Internet. Online. Available 
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government officials involved in supporting defense and security sector reform. NATO-
Ukraine co-operation mechanisms have great potential in this regard.  
 
On the positive side, support given to the MOD by the Verkhovna Rada’s 
National Security and Defense Committee indicates growing involvement of the 
parliament in the defense budget process. By and large, the recent period illustrated 





Not only should a good budget allocate money in an efficient fashion to support 
implementation of plans drafted for a budget period, it should also be an instrument for 
oversight and evaluation of funded programs. In the case of defense budgets, these 
requirements are especially relevant since defense programs can be extremely expensive. 
It is also the case that the costs to society of a failure in the security realm can be even 
higher. 
 
Europe’s hostile security environment of the early 20th century suggested 
maintaining a capable army for a young Ukrainian Republic. The loss of independence by 
Ukraine is largely attributed to the fact that the Central Rada deliberately ignored the 
defense issue.  
 
The subject of this thesis was the evolution of the defense budget process to 
support the development of the Armed Forces in the independent Ukraine of the late 20th 
century. It provided an overview of the roles of the executive branch as well as the 
Verkhovna Rada in shaping military policy and budgets. It identified those factors that 
directly affected budgeting for defense in Ukraine and determined the distribution of 
power in this process as it has unfolded since independence. Policy developments that 
occurred in the Ukrainian defense sector in the period from 2004 to the beginning of 
2006 relevant to the defense budget process were also discussed.  
 
A budget is also a historical record as well as a strategic document. It contains 
information on how the government spent money in the past and how it proposes to 
spend funds in the future. Summarizing the historical record provided in previous 
chapters, this chapter will address the question of whether Ukrainian defense budgets 
serve their strategic function. It will also examine some issues associated with the process 
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of budgeting for defense in Ukraine and suggest some recommendations for further 
research. 
B. OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Ukrainian Parliament initiated the 
nationalization of the portion of the Soviet Armed Forces located in Ukrainian territory. It 
acted promptly to establish an institutional base for the development of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces. But as control over the security sector of the country shifted to the 
President, the parliament’s involvement in the development of the Armed Forces 
decreased dramatically. Several attempts to introduce defense reform and development 
programs undertaken by the executive branch during 1990s failed due to constant lack of 
financial resources for their implementation.  
 
This situation was rooted in severe and lasting economic crises and aggravated by 
the continuous alteration of the Ukrainian national security agenda which required 
corresponding changes to related programs. In other words, funding for defense reform 
made little practical sense since reform itself was encapsulated in ambiguity. But this is 
the case only from a historical perspective. For many years after independence the 
Ukrainian government simply failed to create a cohesive and coherent process to produce 
well considered defense programs and control their implementation. One of the reasons 
for this failure is that the executive branch of the government was acting unilaterally on 
defense issues, including budgeting. Legislative support and oversight was either pro 
forma or non existent. This led to deterioration of the ability of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces to fulfill the tasks they were assigned. Despite a significant reduction in military 
personnel which occurred during the period from 1991 to 2004, the Ukrainian MOD still 
maintained excess infrastructure and inefficient logistical systems. 
 
The main body of Ukrainian defense legislation was developed and adopted by 
the Verkhovna Rada in 1991. It consisted of the Conception of Defense and Development 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the law of Ukraine on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and 
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the law of Ukraine on the Defense of Ukraine. All of these legislative acts contained 
rather general provisions regarding budgeting and financing of the Armed Forces. The 
overall budgeting system in Ukraine was regulated by the 1990 Law on the Budgeting 
System of Ukraine. This law provided almost no parliamentary oversight over the 
execution of the state budget. Defense budgets during the period from 1992 to 1996 were 
represented by lump sums, without clarification of particular categories of spending. 
Moreover, those budgets were barely sufficient to cover the basic needs of the Armed 
Forces. Taking into account the absence of a constitution in Ukraine until 1996, one 
might conclude that the defense budget process during the period from 1992 to 1996 was 
basically regulated by rules produced within the executive branch of the government and 
within the MOD in particular.  
 
The introduction of the Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 and the Budget Code of 
Ukraine in 2001 refined the process of budgeting for defense in Ukraine. In 1996 the 
Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution on a system of budget expenditure classifications. 
After 1999, defense and other programs in the state budget were subdivided into several 
major categories, some of which were additionally portioned into subcategories.   
 
With the introduction of program budgeting in the 2002 Ukrainian state budget, 
defense budgets took on even more detailed forms. However, the MOD did little to 
improve its internal budget process which was not performance oriented and involved 
only a selected portion of the top MOD bureaucracy. Moreover, involvement of the 
parliament in budgeting for defense remained rather limited at all stages of the process.  
 
The period from 2004 to the beginning of 2006 brought about several positive 
developments in the Ukrainian defense budget process. These are attributed to the 
NATO-Ukraine integrative processes and their increased focus on defense reform and 
development. Even before the introduction of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in 
November 2002, which stipulated Ukraine’s policy objectives in the field of defense 
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resource management, NATO and Ukraine established co-operation mechanisms which 
were utilized to implement partnership goals. By performing the activities identified 
within the Annual Target Plans, Ukrainian officials were able to learn, test, and 
eventually implement some of the most efficient international budget practices. The work 
on financial substantiation of the Strategic Defense Bulletin completed in 2004 is a good 
example of this. Furthermore, financial considerations became a key component of 
defense programs drafted thereafter. 
 
Even though the funds allocated to defense in the 2005 state budget were 
somewhat below the amount required to fulfill reform goals for that year, the MOD 
leadership managed to achieve significant results because the funds were appropriated on 
a timely basis. Unfortunately, the deceptive structure of the 2006 defense budget 
proposed by the government revealed that a formal commitment to fund defense at a 
sufficient level made by the President of Ukraine in his December 2005 radio address and 
implemented in a decision of the NSDC was not enough to make bureaucrats react and 
make changes to implement the new policies. Making defense an effective priority of the 
government requires substantial changes in the bureaucratic culture of the Ukrainian 
government. 
 
These changes should be made in a form of well elaborated legislative acts 
considered by all branches of the government. Adoption of the Law on Organization of 
the Defense Planning might be one of such measures. This law, however, contains only 
general provisions for the organization of defense planning and budgeting. It does not 
impose a mechanism to make governmental bureaucracy accountable should it fail to 
implement plans approved by a higher authority. This suggests that the Ukrainian 
legislature still leaves too much power to an executive branch which is not always 
effective in the implementation of its own programs. As a result, Ukrainian defense 
budgets do not work as strategic documents linked to the accomplishment of long-term 
plans.   
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C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis provided a historic overview of the development of the defense budget 
process in Ukraine, including issues that occurred as recently as 2006. A chronological 
sequence of the important events associated with this process and discussed in this paper 
is included in the Appendix. The main problems encountered during the writing of this 
thesis included limited availability of fiscal information on defense spending in Ukraine 
and the mechanisms through which it is conducted.  
 
This suggests a possibility for further research. That said, an analytical description 
of the MOD of Ukraine’s budget procedures would be useful for the improvement the 
defense budget process in Ukraine. Furthermore, a comparison of the legal regulations on 
defense budgeting adopted by the countries which were recently accepted for NATO 
membership (e.g., Poland, Romania, etc.), would be an interesting topic, as Ukraine 
currently strives for the same goal. Finally, further studies could assess which particular 
measures might be priorities for the Ukrainian MOD in order to implement efficient 
budgeting. Would an introduction of some type of a Planning, Programming, Budgeting 
and Execution System common for many NATO countries be relevant for Ukraine at this 
moment? Or should it first improve accounting procedures and practices within the MOD 
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APPENDIX.   CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENSE 





16 July 1990 The Verkhovna Rada passed the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine. 
5 December 1990 
The Law on the Budget System of Ukraine passed by the 
Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As 
amended in 1995, it remained in force through 21 June 2001, 
when the Budget Code of Ukraine was adopted. 
24 August 1991 The Verkhovna Rada proclaimed the independence of Ukraine. 
27 August 1991 
The speaker of the Parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, arranged a 
meeting with senior military commanders to exchange opinions 
about the future of the Ukrainian military. 
3 September 1991 General Morozov was appointed by the Parliament to be the first Ukrainian Minister of Defense. 
11 October 1991 
The Verkhovna Rada adopted the Conception of Defense and 
Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in which it 
denoted the government’s agenda for the creation of the 
Ukrainian military. 
6 December 1991 
The adoption of the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine and 
the Law on the Defense of Ukraine set the legal precedent for 
the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
27 July 1994 Procedural Regulations of the Verkhovna Rada adopted 
June 1995 
The Law on the Budget System of Ukraine was amended to 
strengthen the role of the Verkhovna Rada in the development 
and execution of the state budget, and to provide for more 
transparency in the budget. 
28 June 1996 Approval of the Constitution of Ukraine, establishing budget authority for the Verkhovna Rada 
12 July 1996 A resolution of the Verkhovna Rada introduced a system of budget expenditure classifications. 
9 July 1997 NATO and Ukraine signed the Charter on Distinctive Partnership. 
1998 The NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform was organized. 
21 June 2001 The Budget Code of Ukraine replaced the Law on the Budget System of Ukraine. 
2002 Introduction of program budgeting in the 2002 state budget of Ukraine. 
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22 November 2002 Adoption of a NATO-Ukraine Action Plan at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Prague. 
April 2003-June 2004 Expert Commission conducted review of defense. 
19 June 2003 
Adoption by Verkhovna Rada of the Law on Democratic 
Civilian Control over Military Organization and Law 
Enforcement Bodies of the State. 
2004 
Publication by the Ukrainian government of the Strategic 
Defense Bulletin. It contains the results of the defense review 
and recommendations based on these findings. It is a basic 
document to be used to draft more detailed programs for reform 
and development of the Armed Forces. It also provides financial 
estimates of costs for reform and defines how they should be 
allocated from 2004 to 2015. 
18 October 2004 Verkhovna Rada approved the Law on Organization of Defense Planning.  
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